Burgoyne, seeking to command a major force, proposes to isolate New England by an invasion from Quebec into New York.

This had already been attempted by General Carleton in 1776, although he had stopped short of a full-scale invasion due to the lateness of the season.

Carleton had been heavily criticized in London for not taking advantage of the American retreat from Quebec, and he is also intensely disliked by Germain.

This, combined with rival Henry Clinton's failed attempt to capture Charleston, South Carolina, places Burgoyne in a good position to get command of the 1777 northern campaign.

Burgoyne had presented a written plan to Lord Germain on February 28, 1777; Germain has approved it and has given Burgoyne command of the main expedition.

Burgoyne's invasion plan from Quebec has two components: he will lead the main force of about eight thousand men south from Montreal along Lake Champlain and the Hudson River Valley while a second column of about two thousand men (which Barry St. Leger is chosen to lead), will move from Lake Ontario east down the Mohawk River valley in a strategic diversion.

Both expeditions will converge upon Albany, where they will link up with troops from Howe's army marching up the Hudson.

Control of the Lake Champlain-Lake George-Hudson River route from Canada to New York City will cut off New England from the rest of the American colonies.

The last part of Burgoyne's proposal, the advance by Howe up the Hudson from New York City, proves to be the most controversial part of the campaign.

Germain had approved Burgoyne's plan after having received Howe's letter detailing his proposed offensive against Philadelphia.

Whether Germain told Burgoyne, who was still in London at the time, about Howe's revised plans is unclear: while some sources claim he did, others state that Burgoyne was not notified of the changes until the campaign was well underway.

Historian Robert Ketchum believes that Burgoyne would probably have been aware of the problems that lay ahead had he been notified of the Philadelphia plan.

Whether Germain, Howe, and Burgoyne have the same expectations about the degree to which Howe is supposed to support the invasion from Quebec is also unclear.

What is clear is that Germain has either left his generals with too much latitude, or without a clearly defined overall strategy.

In March 1777 Germain approves of Howe's Philadelphia expedition and does not include any express orders for Howe to go to Albany.

Yet Germain also sends Howe a copy of his instructions to Carleton, which plainly state that the northern army is to make a junction with Howe's army at Albany.

Burgoyne returns to Quebec on May 6, 1777, bearing a letter from Lord Germain that introduces the plan but lacks some details.

This produces another of the conflicts of command that will plague the British throughout the war.

Lieutenant General Burgoyne technically outranks Major General Carleton, but Carleton is still the governor of Quebec.

Germain's instructions to Burgoyne and Carleton have specifically limited Carleton's role to operations in Quebec.

This slight against Carleton, combined with Carleton's failure to get command of the expedition, will lead to his resignation later in 1777, and to his refusal to supply troops from the Quebec regiments to garrison the forts at Crown Point and Ticonderoga after they are captured.

Burgoyne, having convinced King George III and his government of Carleton's faults, has been given command of the British forces charged with gaining control of Lake Champlain and the Hudson River valley.

The plan, largely of his own creation, is for Burgoyne and his force to cross Lake Champlain from Quebec and capture Ticonderoga before advancing on Albany, New York, where they will rendezvous with another British army under General Howe coming north from New York City, and a smaller force that will come down the Mohawk River valley under Barry St. Leger.

This will divide New England from the southern colonies, and, it is believed, make it easier to end the rebellion.

From the beginning Burgoyne is vastly overconfident.

Leading what he believes is an overwhelming force, he sees the campaign largely as a stroll that will make him a national hero who had saved the rebel colonies for the crown.

Before leaving London he had wagered Charles James Fox ten pounds that he would return victorious within a year.

He refuses to heed more cautious voices, both British and American, that suggest a successful campaign using the route he proposes is impossible, as the failed attempt the previous year had shown.

Underlining the plan is the belief that Burgoyne's aggressive thrust from Quebec will be aided by the movements of two other large British forces under Generals Howe and Clinton who will support the advance.

However, Lord Germain's orders dispatched from London are not clear on this point, with the effect that Howe will take no action to support Burgoyne, and Clinton will move from New York too late and in too little strength to be any great help to Burgoyne.

As a result of this miscommunication, Burgoyne will end up conducting the campaign singlehandedly.

He is not yet aware that he will not be gaining additional support, and is still reasonably confident of success.

Having amassed an army of over seven thousand troops in Quebec, Burgoyne is also led to believe by reports that he can rely on the support of large numbers of Native Americans and American Loyalists who will rally to the flag once the British come south.

Even if the countryside is not as pro-British as expected, much of the area between Lake Champlain and Albany is underpopulated anyway, and Burgoyne is skeptical any major enemy force can gather there.

The army that Burgoyne launches on June 14 has about seven thousand regulars and over one hundred and thirty artillery pieces ranging from light mortars to twenty-four pound (eleven kilogram) pieces.

His regulars are organized into an advance force under Brigadier General Simon Fraser, and two divisions.

Major General William Phillips leads the thirty-nine hundred British regulars on the right, while Baron Riedesel's thirty-one hundred Brunswickers and Hanauers hold the left.

His regular troops start out in good condition but some, notably some of the German dragoons, are poorly equipped for wilderness fighting.

Colonel St. Leger's expedition is also assembled by mid-June.

His force, a mixed company of British regulars, Loyalists, Hessians, and rangers from the Indian department, numbering about seven hundred and fifty men, leaves Lachine, near Montreal, on June 23.

Burgoyne's army travels up the lake and occupies the undefended Fort Crown Point by June 30.

The screening activities of Burgoyne's native support are highly effective at keeping the Americans from learning the details of his movements.

General Arthur St. Clair, who has been left in command of Fort Ticonderoga and its surrounding defenses with a garrison of about three thousand regulars and militia, has no idea on July 1 of the full strength of Burgoyne's army, large elements of which are now just four miles (six point four kilometers) away.

St. Clair has been ordered by General Schuyler to hold out as long as possible, and has planned two avenues of retreat.

Open skirmishing begins on the outer defense works of Ticonderoga on July 2.

By July 4, most of the American garrison is either at Fort Ticonderoga or nearby Mount Independence, the extensive fortifications on the Vermont side of the lake.

Unknown to the Americans, their withdrawal from an outer defensive position clears a way for the British to place artillery on the hilltop known then as Sugar Loaf (now Mount Defiance), whose heights command the fort.

St. Clair withdraws the night after spotting British cannon on Sugar Loaf on July 5, and Burgoyne's men occupy the main fortification and the positions on Mount Independence on July 6.

The uncontested surrender of the supposedly impregnable fort causes a public and political uproar.

Although a later investigation will clear both Schuyler and St. Clair of any wrongdoing in the withdrawal, it will cause the Continental Congress to replace Schuyler with General Horatio Gates as commander of the Northern Department of the Continental Army in August.

The bulk of St. Clair's army retreats through the New Hampshire Grants (present-day Vermont).

St. Clair issues appeals to the states for militia support, and also arranges to have as much of the area's livestock and supplies delivered to Fort Edward on the Hudson River, where the American armies will regroup.

St. Clair will reach Fort Edward on July 12 after five days of grueling marches.

Some of the remnants that had been scattered at Hubbardton will rejoin the army, but Seth Warner and the remains of his regiment are stationed at Manchester in the Grants.

Burgoyne sends forces out from his main body to pursue the retreating army, which St. Clair has sent south via two different routes.

The British catch up with elements of the retreating Americans at least three times.

General Fraser and elements of Baron Riedesel's troops face determined resistance in the Battle of Hubbardton on July 7, and ...