The Near and Middle East (1684 – 1827 CE)

Empires in Decline, Pilgrimage Routes in Turmoil, and the Return of Reforming Powers

Geography & Environmental Context

The Near and Middle East spanned the eastern Mediterranean, the Arabian Peninsula, Mesopotamia, Persia, and the Caucasus—a crossroads from the Nile to the Hindu Kush. Its three interlocking subregions—the Near East(Egypt, Hejaz, Yemen, Levant, Sudan, southwestern Turkey, and Cyprus), the Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, eastern Arabia, and most of Anatolia), and Southeast Arabia (southern Oman, eastern Yemen, and Socotra)—together formed a vast zone of deserts, deltas, plateaus, and pilgrimage corridors. Major anchors included the Nile, Tigris–Euphrates, and Zagros–Caucasus uplands; the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Arabian Seacoasts; and the high valleys of Yemen and Oman that bridged Africa and Asia.

Climate & Environmental Shifts

The late Little Ice Age imposed alternating drought and flood.

• Mesopotamia and Iran endured erratic rains and destructive river floods.

• Egypt oscillated between low- and high-Nile years; plague and famine shadowed poor floods.

• Hejaz and Yemen suffered water scarcity punctuated by torrential storms.

• Caucasus winters grew harsher; earthquakes at Tabriz (1721), Shiraz (1824), and along the Levantine Riftreshaped towns.

• Dhofar and Hadhramawt relied on fickle khareef monsoons, while Socotra was struck by periodic cyclones.

Despite volatility, canal maintenance, terrace farming, and nomadic mobility preserved regional resilience.

Subsistence & Settlement

• Mesopotamia & Iran: Irrigated grains, dates, and silk; qanats and canals remained vital to subsistence and taxation.

• Caucasus & Anatolia: Pastoralism and mountain farming—wine, fruit, and grain—supported caravan towns like Tiflis, Yerevan, and Aleppo.

• Levant & Egypt: Terrace agriculture (olives, vines, citrus) complemented Nile wheat, barley, and sugar.

• Arabian littoral: Date groves, pearling, and fishing from Basra to Muscat linked desert to sea.

• Yemen & Oman: Terraced grains, coffee, and frankincense; mixed herding in uplands.

• Sudan: Millet and sorghum in river belts tied to Egypt’s provisioning system after Muḥammad ʿAlī’s conquest (1820–1821).

Urban centers—Cairo, Baghdad, Isfahan, Damascus, Tehran, Muscat, Sanaʿa, and Tiflis—functioned as nodes of governance, trade, and craft.

Technology & Material Culture

• Agrarian infrastructure: Qanats, canals, and dikes remained the hydraulic spine; terrace systems in Yemen and Palestine embodied millennia of continuity.

• Crafts & manufactures: Persian silks and carpets; Aleppine cottons; Damascene soap; Cairene brassware; Georgian and Armenian metallurgy.

• Architecture: Ottoman domes, Safavid and Qajar mosques, Armenian churches, and Yemeni tower-houses defined skylines.

• Maritime innovation: Omani dhows and Red Sea sambuks maintained oceanic trade; firearms and artillery modernized gradually through Ottoman and Persian reforms.

• Printing & learning: The French expedition to Egypt (1798–1801) introduced presses and surveying; by the 1820s Muḥammad ʿAlī’s workshops were producing cotton gins, arms, and canal plans.

Movement & Interaction Corridors

• Caravan arteries: Aleppo–Mosul–Baghdad; Isfahan–Tabriz–Yerevan–Baku; Basra–Shiraz–Hormuz–Muscat.

• Pilgrimage routes: Cairo and Damascus caravans converged on Mecca until disrupted by Wahhabi–Saʿūdī control (1803–1812); Egyptian forces restored Ottoman sovereignty (1811–1818).

• Maritime spheres: Omani fleets projected power across the Indian Ocean to Zanzibar; Hadhrami merchants spread to Gujarat, Southeast Asia, and the Swahili coast.

• Caspian & Black Sea fronts: Russian expansion brought forts and commerce, drawing Persia into treaties (Gulistan 1813, Turkmenchay 1828).

• Nile & Sudan corridors: River convoys moved grain and troops; Khartoum and Sennar became extensions of Cairo’s fiscal reach.

Cultural & Symbolic Expressions

• Ottoman provinces: Sunni institutions, Sufi lodges, and urban guilds organized civic life; Coptic, Armenian, Greek, and Jewish communities sustained schools and trade.

• Persia: Shiʿism remained the ideological core from Safavid through Qajar eras; Isfahan and Tehran mosques, gardens, and miniatures embodied Persian identity.

• Caucasus: Islamic and Christian traditions coexisted; oral epics preserved frontier memory.

• Arabian coasts: Poetry, pearling songs, and mosque schools reflected maritime Islam.

• Hejaz & Yemen: Pilgrimage festivals, Sufi orders, and coffee rituals intertwined devotion and commerce.

• Egypt: Al-Azhar scholars debated governance; after 1798, the Arabic press and translation offices of Muḥammad ʿAlī inaugurated modern intellectual life.

Environmental Adaptation & Resilience

• Nomadic transhumance adjusted to drought belts from Arabia to Iran.

• Oasis and terrace restoration maintained food security.

• Maritime adaptation: Oman’s sea routes and Gulf pearling offset inland disruption.

• Pilgrim provisioning: Waqf-funded cisterns, markets, and bakeries sustained caravans.

• Irrigation renewal: In Egypt, canal repair and proto-barrage planning sought to stabilize Nile floods and expand cotton cultivation.

Political & Military Shocks

• Safavid collapse (1722): Afghan incursions toppled Isfahan; Ottoman and Russian invasions followed.

• Nader Shah (1736–1747): Restored Persian power, campaigned in India and the Caucasus.

• Qajar consolidation (1794–1827): Centralized Iran but ceded territory to Russia.

• Ottoman strain: Frontier wars with Russia; Wahhabi revolt in Arabia; provincial autonomy in Syria and Egypt.

• Muḥammad ʿAlī’s rise (1805): Eliminated Mamluks (1811), reformed army and monopolies, annexed Sudan (1820–1821).

• Omani revival: The Al Bu Saʿid dynasty (from 1749) rebuilt fleets, expelled Portuguese remnants, and dominated Gulf trade.

• European encroachment: Consuls, treaties, and naval patrols—French in the Levant, British in the Gulf and Red Sea—tightened economic dependence though not yet direct rule.

Transition

Between 1684 and 1827 CE, the Near and Middle East transformed from a network of venerable Islamic empires into a patchwork of reforming provinces and maritime powers under growing Eurasian pressure. The Safavids vanished, the Qajars struggled with Russia, and the Ottomans faced internal revolt and European diplomacy. Oman extended Arab reach to East Africa, while Muḥammad ʿAlī’s Egypt pioneered modern bureaucratic reform.
By 1827, caravan and monsoon still ordered daily life, yet behind their continuity loomed the industrial powers of Europe—ready to recast these crossroads into the geopolitical heart of the nineteenth-century world.

The Middle East (1684–1827 CE): Ottoman Decline, Safavid Collapse, and the Rise of New Powers

Geography & Environmental Context

The Middle East includes Iraq, Iran, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, most of Turkey (except the European part and southwest Anatolia), eastern Jordan, all but southernmost Lebanon, eastern Saudi Arabia, and northern Oman. Anchors include the Tigris–Euphrates basin (Mesopotamia), the Zagros and Caucasus ranges, the Iranian Plateau, the Caspian littoral, the Syrian Desert, and the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea coasts. This geography spans irrigated river valleys, steppe corridors, semi-arid plateaus, and mountain enclaves linking Anatolia, Persia, and Arabia.

Climate & Environmental Shifts

The period fell within the late Little Ice Age, producing cooler winters in Anatolia, Armenia, and the Caucasus, alongside recurrent droughts in Mesopotamia and Iran. Floods along the Tigris and Euphrates periodically devastated farmlands, while earthquakes struck Tabriz (1721) and Shiraz (1824). Pastoral nomads in Arabia, Iran, and the Caucasus moved widely to buffer drought, while irrigation in Mesopotamia and northern Iran faltered under war and neglect but revived when political stability returned.

Subsistence & Settlement

• Mesopotamia: Date groves, rice paddies, and cereal fields along the Tigris–Euphrates remained staples; tribal confederations dominated countryside around Ottoman Baghdad.

• Iranian Plateau: Dryland farming (wheat, barley) and oasis gardening (fruit, melons) sustained populations; silk in Gilan and rice in Mazandaran anchored Caspian subsistence.

• Caucasus (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan): Pastoralism, viticulture, and orchards flourished in upland valleys; caravan towns like Tiflis and Yerevan mediated exchange.

• Anatolia & Syria: Grain, olives, and vines in uplands; Aleppo and Damascus remained provisioning and craft centers despite periodic crises.

• Persian Gulf & Oman: Fishing, date cultivation, and pearling dominated, with maritime trade sustaining settlements from Basra to Muscat.

Technology & Material Culture

Agriculture relied on qanats, canals, and animal-powered irrigation. Fortresses and caravanserais dotted plateau routes; mosques, madrasas, and Armenian and Georgian churches anchored towns. Persian silk textiles, Azerbaijani carpets, and Aleppine cottons were prized. Gunpowder weapons, artillery, and fortress improvements spread, though unevenly. Maritime craft ranged from Ottoman galleys to Omani dhows controlling Indian Ocean lanes.

Movement & Interaction Corridors

• Caravan routes: Linked Aleppo to Mosul and Baghdad; Isfahan to Tabriz, Yerevan, and Baku; Basra to the Gulf; Shiraz and Yazd to Hormuz/Muscat.

• Persian Gulf: Omani seafaring extended across the Arabian Sea; Basra exported dates and grain; pearl fisheries tied Bahrain and Qatar to Indian and European markets.

• Caspian trade: Connected Gilan’s silk and Astrakhan’s markets; Russian expansion brought new garrisons and merchants.

• Imperial contest zones: Anatolia and the Caucasus saw repeated wars; Iraq oscillated between Ottoman and Persian control.

Cultural & Symbolic Expressions

• Ottoman provinces: Islam anchored society through mosques, Sufi lodges, and guilds; Armenian and Syriac Christians maintained schools and churches; Jewish communities thrived in Aleppo and Baghdad.

• Safavid Iran: Shi‘ism remained state religion; Isfahan’s mosques and gardens expressed grandeur, though after the Safavid collapse, Qajar art and architecture reshaped Persian identity.

• Caucasus: Christian Orthodoxy (Georgian, Armenian) coexisted with Islam; mountain oral epics and shrine pilgrimages preserved memory.

• Arabian littoral: Tribal poetry, pearl-diver songs, and Omani mosque schools expressed maritime identity.

Environmental Adaptation & Resilience

• Nomadic strategies: Tribal migrations across steppe and desert balanced drought and grazing.

• Oasis and qanat systems: Managed water for cereals and orchards; local repair after war was critical.

• Silk, carpet, and date economies: Offered export resilience when crops failed.

• Maritime trade: Oman and Gulf ports buffered against inland disruption by maintaining Indian Ocean routes.

Transition

Between 1684 and 1827, the Middle East was a contested imperial borderland. The Safavid dynasty collapsed (1722); Afghans, Ottomans, and Russians fought over Iran and the Caucasus. Nader Shah briefly restored Persian power (1736–1747), raiding into India and the Caucasus. The Qajar dynasty (from 1794) consolidated Iran but conceded land to Russia in treaties (Gulistan 1813, Turkmenchay 1828). The Ottoman Empire faced Russian expansion in the Black Sea and Caucasus and Wahhabi revolts in Arabia. Oman emerged as a naval power, dominating the Gulf and East Africa. By 1827, the region was still a mosaic of caravans, mosques, and fortified towns, but the balance of power had tilted toward European and Russian pressures—foreshadowing the 19th-century age of colonial rivalry and reform.

Another struggle for power among the Zands, Qajars, and other tribal groups at Karim Khan Zand's death again disrupts economic life and plunges the country into disorder.

Agha Mohammad Qajar defeats the last Zand ruler outside Kerman in 1794, thus beginning the Qajar dynasty, which will last until 1925.

The Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth century is almost continuously at war with one or more of its enemies—Persia, Poland, Austria, and Russia.

Under the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kaynarja that ends the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-74, the Porte abandons the Tartar khanate in the Crimea, grants autonomy to the Trans-Danubian provinces, allows Russian ships free access to Ottoman waters, and agrees to pay a large war indemnity.

The implications of the decline of Ottoman power, the vulnerability and attractiveness of the empire's vast holdings, the stirrings of nationalism among its subject peoples, and the periodic crises resulting from these and other factors became collectively known to European diplomats in the nineteenth century as "the Eastern Question."

Tsar Nicholas I of Russia will describe the Ottoman Empire as "the sick man of Europe."

The problem from the viewpoint of European diplomacy is how to dispose of the empire in such a manner that no one power will gain an advantage at the expense of the others and upset the political balance of Europe

he Middle East: 1792–1803 CE

Expansion and Assertiveness of the Saudi-Wahhabi State

Under the determined leadership of Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud, the Saudi-Wahhabi state continues its aggressive expansion throughout Arabia. By the early 1790s, Saudi forces solidify control over key strategic and economic centers, further entrenching their dominance and extending strict Wahhabi practices. This aggressive campaign culminates in the conquest of Ta'if in 1802 and the subsequent Wahhabi siege of the sacred city of Mecca in 1803. These successes not only boost their prestige but significantly enhance their economic and political leverage across the Arabian Peninsula.

Qajar Consolidation and Regional Influence

In Persia, the Qajar dynasty, under the firm rule of Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar and, following his assassination in 1797, his successor Fath-Ali Shah Qajar, continues to strengthen its political control. Agha Mohammad Khan decisively consolidates Persian territories, notably reclaiming Khorasan and establishing firm control over Georgia by reconquering Tbilisi in 1795. Following his death, Fath-Ali Shah maintains internal stability, secures the borders, and continues the centralization of administrative and military structures, laying the groundwork for Persia's future stability.

Continued Maritime Dominance of Oman

Under Sultan bin Ahmad al-Busaidi (1792–1804), Oman solidifies its maritime and commercial dominance. Sultan bin Ahmad expands naval capabilities and reinforces control over strategic coastal ports and islands along the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The bustling port of Muscat remains an essential hub for trade, linking Persia, India, and East Africa. Oman's ruling family divides in 1793 into two main lines, with Sultan bin Ahmad's lineage controlling the maritime state, and the Qais branch overseeing the Al Batinah and Ar Rustaq regions. This maritime prosperity supports internal political cohesion and ensures the continued wealth and prominence of the Al-Busaidi dynasty.

Tribal Dynamics and Economic Prosperity in the Persian Gulf

In Qatar, the economic boom in Az Zubarah persists, driven by thriving trade and pearl diving. Tribal rivalries, notably between the Al Khalifa and the Al Jalahima clans, intensify significantly. In 1795, these rivalries culminate in the Al Khalifa conquest of Bahrain, shifting their economic focus away from Az Zubarah, which subsequently declines. The Al Jalahmas, dissatisfied with the Al Khalifa's claims, relocate along the Qatari coast to establish Al Khuwayr, becoming feared maritime raiders, particularly under their leader, Rahman ibn Jabir Al Jalahma. Meanwhile, the Al Thani clan maintains its presence in Qatar, increasingly aligned with Wahhabi principles.

The Al bu Falah clan establishes their headquarters at the site of Abu Dhabi town in 1795, allying themselves strategically with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman against their rivals, the Qawasim pirates of Ra's al-Khaimah and ash-Shariqah sheikhdoms.

Further Decline of Ottoman Influence and Growing Tribal Autonomy

Ottoman authority over its Arab territories continues to wane dramatically, as powerful tribal confederations such as the Muntafiq and the Kurdish Baban Dynasty maintain considerable autonomy in Iraq and Kurdistan, respectively. The weakening grip of the Ottomans results in frequent clashes and localized governance, underscoring the Empire's inability to effectively administer distant provinces. The declining Ottoman presence encourages the further rise of independent tribal and regional leaders, who increasingly negotiate their positions with minimal Ottoman interference.

Legacy of the Era

The era from 1792 to 1803 marks a critical period of territorial and political consolidation for the Saudi-Wahhabi state and the Qajar dynasty, as well as sustained maritime economic prosperity for Oman. The fragmentation of Ottoman authority, coupled with dynamic tribal rivalries and shifting economic fortunes in the Persian Gulf region, establishes enduring patterns of decentralized governance and localized autonomy, significantly shaping the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East for decades to follow.

Oman's ruling family divides in 1793 into two main lines: Sultan ibn Ahmad's line controls the maritime state, with nominal control over the entire country; and the Qais branch has authority over the Al Batinah and Ar Rustaq areas.

After the reign of Sa'id ibn Ahmad Al Sa'id, no other member of the family wins the official approval of the Ibadi religious establishment.

Consequently, the Al Sa'id rulers call themselves sultans, a secular title having none of the religious associations of imam.

The sultan expands the dynasty's possessions in the late eighteenth century to include Bahrain in the Persian Gulf and Bandar-e 'Abbas, Hormuz, and Qeshm (all in Iran).

The threat of central Arabia's militant, puritanical Wahhabi Muslim sect, allied with the Saudis, causes him to conclude a treaty in 1798 with the East India Company that would assure a British presence in Muscat, an important port on the trade route to India.

Heraclius II of Georgia had asked General Gudovich, commander of the Russian Caucasian Line, for renewed military aid when Agha Mohammad Khan, head of the Qajar tribe that has ruled the eastern part of Persia (Iran) from 1785, was in Tabriz in 1791, but the government in St. Petersburg did not judge it expedient to send troops again to Georgia.

In 1792, Gudovich told Heraclius that he would receive only diplomatic support in the advent of any Iranian onslaught.

Despite being left to his own devices, Heraclius still cherishes a dream of establishing, with Russian protection, a strong and united monarchy, into which the western Georgian Kingdom of Imereti and the lost provinces under Ottoman rule will all eventually be drawn.

The consequences of these events come a few years later, when a new dynasty, the Qajars, emerge victorious in the protracted power struggle in Persia.

Their head, Agha Mohammad Khan, as his first objective, has resolved to bring the Caucasus again fully under the Persian orbit.

For Agha Mohammah Khan, the resubjugation and reintegration of Georgia into the Iranian Empire is part of the same process that has brought Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tabriz under his rule.

He views, like the Safavids and Nader Shah before him, the territories no different than the territories in mainland Iran.

Georgia is a province of Iran the same way Khorasan is.

As the Cambridge History of Iran states, its permanent secession was inconceivable and had to be resisted in the same way as one would resist an attempt at the separation of Fars or Gilan.

It is therefore natural for Agha Mohammad Khan to perform whatever necessary means in the Caucasus in order to subdue and reincorporate the recently lost regions following Nader Shah's death and the demise of the Zands, including putting down what in Iranian eyes is seen as treason on the part of the wali of Georgia.

Finding an interval of peace amid their own quarrels and with northern, western, and central Persia secure, the Persians demand Heraclius II to renounce the treaty with Russia and to reaccept Persian suzerainty, in return for peace and the security of his kingdom.

The Ottomans, Iran's neighboring rival, recognize Iran's rights over Kartli and Kakheti for the first time in four centuries.

Heraclius appeals now to his theoretical protector, Empress Catherine II of Russia, pleading for at least three thoisand Russian troops, but he is not listened to, leaving Georgia to fend off the Persian threat alone.

Nevertheless, Heraclius II still rejects the Khan’s ultimatum.

While at Ganja, having secured Shirvan, Agha Mohammad Khan is joined by Javad Khan Qajar and the rest of his right wing contingent.

At Ganja, Mohammad Khan sends Heraclius II his last ultimatum, who receives it in September 1795.

Agha Mohammad Khan crosses the Aras river in August 1795 with a seventy thousand-strong army.

This force is divided in three: the left wing is sent in the direction of Erivan, the right one parallel to the Caspian Sea into the Mughan across the lower Aras towards Dagestan and Shirvan, while the Shah heads the center force himself, advancing towards the fortress of Shusha in the Karabakh Khanate, which he besieges between July 8 and August 9, 1795.

His right and left wing force the Khans of Ganja and Erivan into alliance respectively.

Having abandoned the siege of Shusha due to stiff resistance, which is further aided by Georgian crown prince Aleksandre, the Khan of Karabakh, Ibrahim Khan, eventually surrenders to Mohammad Khan after discussions, including the paying of regular tribute and to surrender hostages, though the Qajar forces are still denied entrance to Shusha.

Since the main objective is Georgia, Mohammad Khan is willing to have Karabakh secured by this agreement for now, for he and his army subsequently move further.

Heraclius, his advisors divided, ignores the ultimatum, but sends couriers to St.Petersburg.

Gudovich, who sits in Georgievsk at this time, instructs Heraclius to avoid "expense and fuss", while Heraclius, together with Solomon II and some Imeretians, heads southwards of Tbilisi to fend off the Iranians.