The Safavi Empire declines after the death of Shah Abbas in 1629 as a result of weak rulers, interference by the women of the harem in politics, the reemergence of Qizilbash rivalries, maladministration of state lands, excessive taxation, reduced trade, and the weakening of Safavi military organization. (Both the Qizilbash tribal military organization and the standing army composed of slave soldiers are deteriorating.)

The Ottoman sultan Suleyman had occupied Baghdad in 1533, then extended Ottoman rule to southern Iraq.

Iraq remains firmly in Ottoman hands except for a brief period (1624-38) when Safavi rule is restored.

The Ottomans also continue to challenge the Safavis for control of Azarbaijan and the Caucasus until the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin in 1639 establishes frontiers in both Iraq and in the Caucasus that remain virtually unchanged.

The Safavi state reaches its apogee during the reign of Shah Abbas (1587-1629).

The shah gains breathing space to confront and defeat the Uzbeks by signing a largely disadvantageous treaty with the Ottomans.

He then fights successful campaigns against the Ottomans, reestablishing Iranian control over Iraq, Georgia, and parts of the Caucasus.

He counterbalances the power of the Qizilbash by creating a body of troops composed of enslaved Georgians and Armenians who are loyal to the person of the shah.

He extends state and crown lands and the provinces directly administered by the state, at the expense of the Qizilbash chiefs.

He relocates tribes to weaken their power, strengthens the bureaucracy, and further centralizes the administration.

The Safavids reconquer Baghdad in 1623 under the leadership of Shah Abbas (1587-1629), but they are expelled in 1638 after a series of brilliant military maneuvers by the dynamic Ottoman sultan, Murad IV.

The major impact of the Safavid-Ottoman conflict on Iraqi history is the deepening of the Shia-Sunni rift.

Both the Ottomans and the Safavids use Sunni and Shia Islam respectively to mobilize domestic support.

Thus, Iraq's Sunni population suffers immeasurably during the brief Safavid reign (1623-38), while Iraq's Shias will be excluded from power altogether during the longer period of Ottoman supremacy (1638-1916).

The Sunnis during the Ottoman period gain the administrative experience that will allow them to monopolize political power in the twentieth century.

The Sunnis are able to take advantage of new economic and educational opportunities while the Shias, frozen out of the political process, remain politically impotent and economically depressed.

The frequent conflicts with the Safavids have sapped the strength of the Ottoman Empire by the seventeenth century and have weakened its control over its provinces.

Tribal authority once again dominates in Iraq.

The nomadic population swells with the influx of Bedouin from Najd, in the Arabian Peninsula.

Bedouin raids on settled areas become impossible to curb.

The large and powerful Muntafiq tribal confederation takes shape in the interior, under the leadership of the Sunni Saadun family of Mecca.

The Shamman—one of the biggest tribal confederations of the Arabian Peninsula—enter the Syrian desert and clash with the `Anazzah confederation.

A new tribal confederation, the Bani Lam, takes root on the lower Tigris near Al Amarah.

The Kurdish Baban Dynasty emerges in the north and organizes Kurdish resistance.

The resistance makes it impossible for the Ottomans to maintain even nominal suzerainty over Iraqi Kurdistan (land of the Kurds).

Between 1625 and 1668, local shaykhs rule Al Basrah and the marshlands, home of the Madan (Marsh Arabs).

The powerful shaykhs basically ignore the Ottoman governor of Baghdad.

The Safavid rulers of Persia had captured Baghdad in 1509 but lost it to the Ottomans a generation later.

The Ottoman pasha (governor) n Baghdad and the military have for some years vied for control of the city.

The struggle had become crucial in 1621, when a Janissary officer had formed a faction; he has for the past two years wielded more power than the pasha.

As he and the Janissaries are now masters of Baghdad, the officer applies to the Porte for recognition as the new pasha, but in vain.

He next turns to Shah 'Abbas for aid, gaining a small Persian relief force just as the Porte agrees to grant him recognition.

Renouncing 'Abbas, he finds himself attacked by the Persians and is killed in 1623 as they make the city again part of their empire.

The Middle East: 1624–1635 CE

Rise of the Yarubids and the Liberation of Oman

In 1624, the Yarubid dynasty emerges in Oman, marking the end of a brief restoration of Nabhani rule that had begun around 1600. Imam Nasir bin Murshid bin Sultan al-Ya'aruba (r. 1624–1649), a member of the Ya'rub tribe, is elected to lead the newly founded Yarubid imamate—Oman's fifth. Under his rule, Oman unifies its fragmented tribes with the goal of expelling the Portuguese, who have occupied Muscat since 1508, fortifying the city to protect their vital sea lanes.

Imam Nasir relocates the capital to Nizwa, an ancient center of Ibadi authority, strengthening his legitimacy. His forces achieve key victories, retaking towns and fortresses from Portuguese control. In 1633, the Omani army liberates Julfar (modern Ras al-Khaimah). These efforts coincide strategically with English attacks on Portuguese holdings, collectively weakening Portuguese dominance and contributing to a significant shift in regional power dynamics.

Fakhr al-Din II’s Expansion and Ottoman Reaction

In Mount Lebanon, Emir Fakhr al-Din II ibn Maan continues to consolidate and expand his authority, fostering religious tolerance and economic prosperity. His openness to European influences, particularly from Tuscany, introduces advanced agricultural methods and new industries, significantly enhancing the region’s economy.

However, Fakhr al-Din's growing autonomy and foreign alliances alarm the Ottoman authorities. Sultan Murad IV (r. 1623–1640) sees Fakhr al-Din’s semi-independent emirate as a threat to Ottoman sovereignty. By 1633, tensions escalate, and the Ottoman Empire prepares to assert its dominance over Mount Lebanon more forcefully.

Ottoman–Safavid Conflict and Baghdad’s Strategic Importance

The ongoing rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia persists, particularly over the crucial city of Baghdad. The Safavid ruler Shah Abbas I (r. 1588–1629) defends Baghdad effectively until his death in 1629, after which internal weaknesses emerge under his successor, Shah Safi (r. 1629–1642).

Recognizing the Safavid vulnerability, Ottoman Sultan Murad IV renews military offensives. By 1635, Murad IV personally leads Ottoman forces into Persian territories, initiating preparations to reclaim Baghdad, reinforcing the city’s symbolic and strategic significance in the Ottoman–Safavid conflict.

Cultural and Economic Flourishing in Isfahan and Aleppo

Isfahan remains a vibrant cultural and artistic hub, continuing significant architectural projects under Shah Abbas I and his successor, Shah Safi. Major construction efforts maintain Isfahan’s role as a center of Safavid cultural and political power.

Meanwhile, Aleppo continues to flourish economically under Ottoman rule, serving as a critical commercial link between Europe and the Middle East. Its markets attract European merchants eager for textiles, spices, and luxury goods, strengthening economic ties and facilitating cultural exchanges between East and West.

Legacy of the Era

The period between 1624 and 1635 is marked by notable geopolitical changes: the Yarubid dynasty significantly alters the power structure in Oman, expelling Portuguese colonial forces; Fakhr al-Din II’s independent policies challenge Ottoman supremacy, prompting a decisive imperial response; and the renewed Ottoman–Safavid rivalry underscores Baghdad’s centrality in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Collectively, these developments reshape regional dynamics, setting the stage for future conflicts and alliances.

The Safavid Shah 'Abbas, who has not only restored Iranian power but also conquered Iraq, ends anarchy in Iran in 1624 and threatens to take the entire Ottoman Empire.

Abbas had in 1623 decided to take back Mesopotamia, which had been lost by his grandfather Tahmasp.

Profiting from the confusion surrounding the accession of the new sultan Murad IV, he pretends to be making a pilgrimage to the Shi'ite shrines of Kerbala and Najaf, but uses his army to seize Baghdad on January 14, 1624.

Queen Ketevan of Kakheti, sent in 1514 by her son King as a negotiator to Shah Abbas, had effectively surrendered herself as an honorary hostage in a failed attempt to prevent Kakheti from being attacked by the Iranian armies.

She has been held in Shiraz for several years until Abbas, in an act of revenge for the recalcitrance of Teimuraz, orders the queen to renounce Christianity, and upon her refusal, has her tortured to death with red-hot pincers in September 1624.

Four months later, portions of her relics will be clandestinely taken by the St. Augustine Portuguese Catholic missionaries, eyewitnesses of her martyrdom, to Georgia where they will be interred at the Alaverdi Cathedral.

'Abbas had been distracted by the rebellion in Georgia in 1624, which had allowed an Ottoman force to besiege Baghdad, but the shah comes to its relief in 1625 and decisively crushes the Turkish army.