Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments, published…
1756 CE to 1767 CE
Broadly speaking, Smith follows the views of his mentor, Francis Hutcheson of the University of Glasgow, who divided moral philosophy into four parts: Ethics and Virtue; Private rights and Natural liberty; Familial rights (called Economics); and State and Individual rights (called Politics).
Hutcheson had abandoned the psychological view of moral philosophy, claiming that motives were too fickle to be used as a basis for a philosophical system. Instead, he hypothesized a dedicated "sixth sense" to explain morality.
This idea, to be taken up by David Hume (see Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature), claimed that man is pleased by utility.
Smith has rejected his teacher's reliance on this special sense.
Starting in about 1741, Smith had set on the task of using Hume's experimental method (appealing to human experience) to replace the specific moral sense with a pluralistic approach to morality based on a multitude of psychological motives.
Smith departs from the "moral sense" tradition of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, as the principle of sympathy takes the place of that organ.
"Sympathy" is the term Smith uses for the feeling of these moral sentiments.
It is the feeling with the passions of others.
It operates through a logic of mirroring, in which a spectator imaginatively reconstructs the experience of the person he watches.
However, Smith rejects the idea that Man is capable of forming moral judgements beyond a limited sphere of activity, again centered around his own self-interest
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