Cavalry skirmishing between Wilson's and Forrest's troopers…

Cavalry skirmishing between Wilson's and Forrest's troopers continues throughout the day.

Forrest's wide turning movement with four thousand troopers had forced Wilson north to Hurt's Corner, preventing the Union horsemen from interfering with Hood's infantry advance.

By 10 a.m., Forrest had ordered his men to turn west toward Spring Hill.

Wilson had sent multiple messages to Schofield warning of Hood's advance, but it was not until dawn on November 29 that Schofield believed the reports and realized the predicament he was in.

He had sent Stanley north with portions of the IV Corps to protect the trains, but also to hold the crossroads at Spring Hill to allow the entire army to withdraw safely to Franklin.

Forrest's cavalrymen run into pickets from the IV Corps; Stanley had moved north rapidly and formed up positions with Wagner's division that protect the village of Spring Hill on three sides.

The brigade of Colonel John Q. Lane rushes forward and pushes back the dismounted cavalrymen.

Major General Patrick R. Cleburne's division of Cheatham's corps arrives midafternoon on Forrest's left.

The cavalrymen, low on ammunition, pull out of the line and move north to be ready to cover a further advance of Hood's army, or to block Schofield's withdrawal.

The first command miscommunication of the battle takes place upon Hood's arrival.

Cheatham had ordered his division under Major General William B. Bate to move against Spring Hill in concert with Cleburne, forming up on the Irishman's left.

Hood had then personally ordered Bate to move towards the Columbia Pike and "sweep toward Columbia."

Neither Bate nor Hood had bothered to inform Cheatham of this change in orders.

At about 5:30 p.m., Bate's lead element of sharpshooters fires on a Federal column approaching from their left—Major General Thomas H. Ruger's division of the XXIII Corps, the vanguard of Schofield's main body.

But before the two divisions can engage in battle, an officer from Cheatham's staff arrives to insist that Bate follow Cheatham's original orders and join Cleburne's attack.

Late that night, Bate reports the contact with the Federal column, but Cheatham discounts the importance of the encounter.

Back in Columbia, Schofield had become convinced at about 3 p.m. that the Confederates would not attack him there and he had begun marching his men to Spring Hill.

As soon as the initial units departed, Stephen D. Lee had coincidentally begun an attack against the Union position.

By the time the bulk of his two divisions are able to cross, the senior Union commander left behind at Columbia, Brigadier General Jacob D. Cox, had begun his withdrawal and the final troops depart up the Franklin Pike by 10 p.m. Cleburne's three thousand men had begun an attack against Bradley's brigade at about 4 p.m.

Whereas Cheatham had been expecting Cleburne to drive north into Spring Hill, Hood's intention had been to use this formation to sweep toward the turnpike and wheel left to intercept Schofield's arriving units.

Cleburne had wheeled his brigades into a northern alignment against Bradley's right flank, causing Bradley and his men to flee in disorder.

Cleburne's two brigades had chased them vigorously, and they had ben stopped short of the turnpike only by heavy fire from the IV Corps artillery.

By this time, Cheatham's division under Major General John C. Brown has been moved into position for another attack on Spring Hill, on Cleburne's right.

Brown does not attack, however.

It is reported that there are Union troops in position on his right flank and front and that Forrest's cavalrymen, promised to protect his right flank, do not seem to be present.

Brown decides to consult with his corps commander before proceeding, sending two staff officers to find Cheatham and halting his troops while he awaits a decision.

By the time Cheatham and Brown are able to speak, the battlefield is in total darkness, and the two officers decide that an assault conducted then without knowing the condition of their right flank might be a disaster.

Hood is furious that the attack had not proceeded as he intended and that the pike is still open.

He dispatches a staff officer to find Stewart to assist Cheatham.

Having been up since 3 a.m., Hood goes to bed at 9 p.m., confident that whatever setbacks his army has suffered during the day, they will be able to correct them in the morning and bag Schofield.