The Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth century is almost continuously at war with one or more of its enemies—Persia, Poland, Austria, and Russia.

Under the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kaynarja that ends the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-74, the Porte abandons the Tartar khanate in the Crimea, grants autonomy to the Trans-Danubian provinces, allows Russian ships free access to Ottoman waters, and agrees to pay a large war indemnity.

The implications of the decline of Ottoman power, the vulnerability and attractiveness of the empire's vast holdings, the stirrings of nationalism among its subject peoples, and the periodic crises resulting from these and other factors became collectively known to European diplomats in the nineteenth century as "the Eastern Question."

Tsar Nicholas I of Russia will describe the Ottoman Empire as "the sick man of Europe."

The problem from the viewpoint of European diplomacy is how to dispose of the empire in such a manner that no one power will gain an advantage at the expense of the others and upset the political balance of Europe

The Middle East: 1768–1779 CE

Continued Saudi-Wahhabi Expansion

Between 1768 and 1779, the Saudi-Wahhabi state, under the vigorous leadership of Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud, continues its aggressive expansion and consolidation efforts across the Arabian Peninsula. The austere and puritanical doctrines of Wahhabism further motivate the Saudi forces to confront both Sunni and Shia rivals, systematically enforcing religious orthodoxy across the territories they control. Under Abdul Aziz's command, significant efforts are made to subdue remaining resistant centers, notably the crucial city of Riyadh, which falls decisively into Saudi-Wahhabi hands in 1773. This victory enhances their political authority and facilitates further unification of Najdi tribes under their rigid religious and political framework.

Regional Struggles and the Rise of the Qajar Dynasty

In Persia, the weakening Zand dynasty, led by Karim Khan Zand until his death in 1779, maintains a tenuous hold on power amidst growing factionalism and tribal rebellion. This decline creates opportunities for ambitious tribal leaders like the Qajars, under Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar, to extend their influence. The Qajars consolidate power in Mazandaran, Astarabad, and parts of northern Persia, laying critical groundwork for their eventual dominance. Their rise intensifies regional instability, influencing political dynamics across adjacent territories.

Oman: Maritime Dominance and Internal Stability

Ahmad bin Said al-Busaidi continues to solidify Oman’s maritime power and internal stability, reinforcing Muscat as a prosperous trading hub in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. His reign fosters economic and political consolidation, further distancing the capital from traditional Ibadi centers and strengthening centralized governance. Under Ahmad’s leadership, Oman asserts increasing maritime influence, securing trade routes and protecting its interests against regional competitors.

Persian Gulf: Tribes and Economic Rivalries

Economic prosperity driven by pearl harvesting and maritime trade continues to shape social and political dynamics in the Persian Gulf region. The settlement of the Al Khalifa and Al Jalahima clans in Qatar’s prosperous Az Zubarah deepens local rivalries, particularly with the Al Thani clan, who embrace Wahhabi doctrines. The competition over economic resources and ideological differences creates tension and sporadic conflict, notably between the Wahhabi-influenced Al Thani and the non-Wahhabi Al Khalifa. Such tribal competition characterizes the economic and political climate of the Gulf throughout this era.

Declining Ottoman Influence

Throughout the period, Ottoman control over its Arab provinces continues to weaken as tribal autonomy and local governance increasingly assert themselves. In southern Iraq and northern Kurdish territories, tribal leaders such as the Muntafiq, Bani Lam, and the Baban Dynasty reinforce their independence, successfully resisting centralized Ottoman authority. This period further entrenches decentralized governance, limiting the Ottoman Empire's capacity to effectively administer its distant Arab provinces.

Legacy of the Era

The years 1768 to 1779 witness critical transformations in regional power structures, characterized by the continued territorial and ideological expansion of the Saudi-Wahhabi state, the emerging dominance of the Qajar dynasty in Persia, and sustained maritime prosperity under Oman’s Al Bu Sa'id dynasty. These developments occur alongside increasing tribal autonomy and declining Ottoman influence, shaping enduring political, economic, and social landscapes across the Middle East.

The Middle East: 1780–1791 CE

Saudi-Wahhabi Consolidation and Expansion

Between 1780 and 1791, the Saudi-Wahhabi state under Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud significantly consolidates its dominance across the Arabian Peninsula. Continuing aggressive military campaigns, Saudi forces extend their strict Wahhabi doctrines deeper into eastern Arabia, notably taking control of Al-Hasa, an essential center of Shi'a influence and economic prosperity, in 1790. The capture of Al-Hasa strengthens Saudi economic resources through access to valuable trade routes and fertile agricultural lands, reinforcing the political and religious unification of Najdi tribes under the expanding Saudi state.

Ascendancy of the Qajar Dynasty

In Persia, the Qajar dynasty decisively rises under the leadership of Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar, capitalizing on the fragmented and declining authority of the Zand rulers following Karim Khan Zand's death in 1779. By systematically subduing rival factions and tribal groups, Agha Mohammad Khan expands his rule across central and northern Persia, notably seizing Tehran in 1786 and making it the new capital of the Qajar realm. His rigorous military campaigns set the stage for the Qajar dynasty's dominance, reshaping Persia’s political landscape for the coming century.

Oman: Economic Stability and Maritime Dominance

Under the reign of Said bin Ahmad al-Busaidi (1783–1786) followed by Hamad bin Said al-Busaidi (1786–1792), Oman maintains and enhances its regional maritime dominance. Muscat continues to flourish as a vital trade hub, with increasing commercial interactions across the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The ongoing prosperity reinforces internal stability and enables further centralization of power away from traditional Ibadi tribal centers toward the commercially vibrant coast.

Persian Gulf: Tribal Rivalries and Economic Competition

The late eighteenth century witnesses intensified competition among prominent tribal groups around the Persian Gulf, driven largely by economic motivations linked to pearl diving and trade. In Qatar, the settlement of Az Zubarah continues to thrive economically, despite ongoing hostilities between the Al Khalifa and Al Jalahima clans. The Al Thani clan further asserts its Wahhabi-influenced political identity, fueling tensions with other local factions. Such tribal rivalries remain critical determinants of regional stability and economic power dynamics.

Declining Ottoman Authority and Tribal Autonomy

Ottoman authority across its Arab provinces continues to diminish significantly during this period, with local tribal leaders exercising increasing autonomy. Tribal confederations such as the Muntafiq, Bani Lam, and the Baban Dynasty expand their influence in southern Iraq and Kurdish territories, respectively, frequently resisting Ottoman efforts to reassert centralized control. This period marks a clear trend toward decentralized governance, underscoring the weakening grip of the Ottoman Empire on its peripheral Arab territories.

Legacy of the Era

The era from 1780 to 1791 solidifies major shifts in Middle Eastern geopolitics, highlighted by the Saudi-Wahhabi state's territorial and doctrinal expansion, the definitive rise of the Qajar dynasty in Persia, and the sustained maritime prosperity of Oman. Coupled with increasing tribal autonomy and declining Ottoman influence, these developments lay foundational elements for the enduring political, social, and economic patterns that continue to shape the region.

The Treaty of Georgievsk, a bilateral treaty concluded between the Russian Empire and the east Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti on July 24, 1783, establishes eastern Georgia as a protectorate of Russia, which guarantees its territorial integrity and the continuation of its reigning Bagrationi dynasty in return for prerogatives in the conduct of Georgian foreign affairs.'

By this, eastern Georgia abjures any form of dependence on Persia (who had been its suzerain for centuries) or another power, and every new Georgian monarch of Kartli-Kakheti will require the confirmation and investiture of the Russian tsar.

he Middle East: 1792–1803 CE

Expansion and Assertiveness of the Saudi-Wahhabi State

Under the determined leadership of Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud, the Saudi-Wahhabi state continues its aggressive expansion throughout Arabia. By the early 1790s, Saudi forces solidify control over key strategic and economic centers, further entrenching their dominance and extending strict Wahhabi practices. This aggressive campaign culminates in the conquest of Ta'if in 1802 and the subsequent Wahhabi siege of the sacred city of Mecca in 1803. These successes not only boost their prestige but significantly enhance their economic and political leverage across the Arabian Peninsula.

Qajar Consolidation and Regional Influence

In Persia, the Qajar dynasty, under the firm rule of Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar and, following his assassination in 1797, his successor Fath-Ali Shah Qajar, continues to strengthen its political control. Agha Mohammad Khan decisively consolidates Persian territories, notably reclaiming Khorasan and establishing firm control over Georgia by reconquering Tbilisi in 1795. Following his death, Fath-Ali Shah maintains internal stability, secures the borders, and continues the centralization of administrative and military structures, laying the groundwork for Persia's future stability.

Continued Maritime Dominance of Oman

Under Sultan bin Ahmad al-Busaidi (1792–1804), Oman solidifies its maritime and commercial dominance. Sultan bin Ahmad expands naval capabilities and reinforces control over strategic coastal ports and islands along the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The bustling port of Muscat remains an essential hub for trade, linking Persia, India, and East Africa. Oman's ruling family divides in 1793 into two main lines, with Sultan bin Ahmad's lineage controlling the maritime state, and the Qais branch overseeing the Al Batinah and Ar Rustaq regions. This maritime prosperity supports internal political cohesion and ensures the continued wealth and prominence of the Al-Busaidi dynasty.

Tribal Dynamics and Economic Prosperity in the Persian Gulf

In Qatar, the economic boom in Az Zubarah persists, driven by thriving trade and pearl diving. Tribal rivalries, notably between the Al Khalifa and the Al Jalahima clans, intensify significantly. In 1795, these rivalries culminate in the Al Khalifa conquest of Bahrain, shifting their economic focus away from Az Zubarah, which subsequently declines. The Al Jalahmas, dissatisfied with the Al Khalifa's claims, relocate along the Qatari coast to establish Al Khuwayr, becoming feared maritime raiders, particularly under their leader, Rahman ibn Jabir Al Jalahma. Meanwhile, the Al Thani clan maintains its presence in Qatar, increasingly aligned with Wahhabi principles.

The Al bu Falah clan establishes their headquarters at the site of Abu Dhabi town in 1795, allying themselves strategically with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman against their rivals, the Qawasim pirates of Ra's al-Khaimah and ash-Shariqah sheikhdoms.

Further Decline of Ottoman Influence and Growing Tribal Autonomy

Ottoman authority over its Arab territories continues to wane dramatically, as powerful tribal confederations such as the Muntafiq and the Kurdish Baban Dynasty maintain considerable autonomy in Iraq and Kurdistan, respectively. The weakening grip of the Ottomans results in frequent clashes and localized governance, underscoring the Empire's inability to effectively administer distant provinces. The declining Ottoman presence encourages the further rise of independent tribal and regional leaders, who increasingly negotiate their positions with minimal Ottoman interference.

Legacy of the Era

The era from 1792 to 1803 marks a critical period of territorial and political consolidation for the Saudi-Wahhabi state and the Qajar dynasty, as well as sustained maritime economic prosperity for Oman. The fragmentation of Ottoman authority, coupled with dynamic tribal rivalries and shifting economic fortunes in the Persian Gulf region, establishes enduring patterns of decentralized governance and localized autonomy, significantly shaping the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East for decades to follow.

Oman's ruling family divides in 1793 into two main lines: Sultan ibn Ahmad's line controls the maritime state, with nominal control over the entire country; and the Qais branch has authority over the Al Batinah and Ar Rustaq areas.

After the reign of Sa'id ibn Ahmad Al Sa'id, no other member of the family wins the official approval of the Ibadi religious establishment.

Consequently, the Al Sa'id rulers call themselves sultans, a secular title having none of the religious associations of imam.

The sultan expands the dynasty's possessions in the late eighteenth century to include Bahrain in the Persian Gulf and Bandar-e 'Abbas, Hormuz, and Qeshm (all in Iran).

The threat of central Arabia's militant, puritanical Wahhabi Muslim sect, allied with the Saudis, causes him to conclude a treaty in 1798 with the East India Company that would assure a British presence in Muscat, an important port on the trade route to India.

Mahmud, assisted by his vizier, Fatteh Khan Barakzay, eldest son of Sardar Payenda Khan, and by Persian ruler Fath 'Ali Shah, takes Qandahar and advances on Kabul.

Zaman, in India, hurries back to Afghanistan, where, in 1800, he is handed over to his brother Mahmud, blinded, and imprisoned.

As Shah, Mahmud leaves affairs of state to Fath Khan.

Some of the chiefs who harbor grievances against the King or his ministers join forces and invite Zaman's brother Shoja' to Kabul.

Heraclius II of Georgia had asked General Gudovich, commander of the Russian Caucasian Line, for renewed military aid when Agha Mohammad Khan, head of the Qajar tribe that has ruled the eastern part of Persia (Iran) from 1785, was in Tabriz in 1791, but the government in St. Petersburg did not judge it expedient to send troops again to Georgia.

In 1792, Gudovich told Heraclius that he would receive only diplomatic support in the advent of any Iranian onslaught.

Despite being left to his own devices, Heraclius still cherishes a dream of establishing, with Russian protection, a strong and united monarchy, into which the western Georgian Kingdom of Imereti and the lost provinces under Ottoman rule will all eventually be drawn.

The consequences of these events come a few years later, when a new dynasty, the Qajars, emerge victorious in the protracted power struggle in Persia.

Their head, Agha Mohammad Khan, as his first objective, has resolved to bring the Caucasus again fully under the Persian orbit.

For Agha Mohammah Khan, the resubjugation and reintegration of Georgia into the Iranian Empire is part of the same process that has brought Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tabriz under his rule.

He views, like the Safavids and Nader Shah before him, the territories no different than the territories in mainland Iran.

Georgia is a province of Iran the same way Khorasan is.

As the Cambridge History of Iran states, its permanent secession was inconceivable and had to be resisted in the same way as one would resist an attempt at the separation of Fars or Gilan.

It is therefore natural for Agha Mohammad Khan to perform whatever necessary means in the Caucasus in order to subdue and reincorporate the recently lost regions following Nader Shah's death and the demise of the Zands, including putting down what in Iranian eyes is seen as treason on the part of the wali of Georgia.

Finding an interval of peace amid their own quarrels and with northern, western, and central Persia secure, the Persians demand Heraclius II to renounce the treaty with Russia and to reaccept Persian suzerainty, in return for peace and the security of his kingdom.

The Ottomans, Iran's neighboring rival, recognize Iran's rights over Kartli and Kakheti for the first time in four centuries.

Heraclius appeals now to his theoretical protector, Empress Catherine II of Russia, pleading for at least three thoisand Russian troops, but he is not listened to, leaving Georgia to fend off the Persian threat alone.

Nevertheless, Heraclius II still rejects the Khan’s ultimatum.

While at Ganja, having secured Shirvan, Agha Mohammad Khan is joined by Javad Khan Qajar and the rest of his right wing contingent.

At Ganja, Mohammad Khan sends Heraclius II his last ultimatum, who receives it in September 1795.

Agha Mohammad Khan crosses the Aras river in August 1795 with a seventy thousand-strong army.

This force is divided in three: the left wing is sent in the direction of Erivan, the right one parallel to the Caspian Sea into the Mughan across the lower Aras towards Dagestan and Shirvan, while the Shah heads the center force himself, advancing towards the fortress of Shusha in the Karabakh Khanate, which he besieges between July 8 and August 9, 1795.

His right and left wing force the Khans of Ganja and Erivan into alliance respectively.

Having abandoned the siege of Shusha due to stiff resistance, which is further aided by Georgian crown prince Aleksandre, the Khan of Karabakh, Ibrahim Khan, eventually surrenders to Mohammad Khan after discussions, including the paying of regular tribute and to surrender hostages, though the Qajar forces are still denied entrance to Shusha.

Since the main objective is Georgia, Mohammad Khan is willing to have Karabakh secured by this agreement for now, for he and his army subsequently move further.