The importance of Brazil's military crisis is…
1876 CE to 1887 CE
The importance of Brazil's military crisis is clearer because it removes the armed prop of the regime.
After the Paraguayan War (1864-70), the monarchy had been indifferent to the army, which the civilian elite did not perceive as a threat.
The fiscal problems of the 1870s slow promotions to a crawl, salaries are frozen, and officers complain about having to contribute to a widows' fund from their meager salaries.
Moreover, the soldiers in the ranks are considered the dregs of society, discipline is based on the lash, and training seems pointless.
The gulf between the military and the civilian oligarchies broadens.
The political parties are as indifferent as the government to demands for military reform, for obligatory military service, for better armament, and for higher pay and status.
During the 1870s, the discontent is checked by the National Guard's reduced role; by an unsuccessful but welcomed attempt to improve the recruitment system; and, especially, by the cabinet service of war heroes, including the Duke of Caxias as prime minister (1875-78) and Marshal Manuel Luis Osorio, the Marquis of Herval, as minister of war (1878), but the latter dies in 1879 and Caxias the year after, leaving leadership to officers less committed to the throne.
The junior officer ranks are filled with men from the middle sectors who have entered the army to obtain an education rather than to follow a military career.
They are more concerned than their predecessors with social changes that will open opportunities to the lower middle class.