The soft spot that Koreans have in their hearts for China is not, however, the main characteristic of Korea's traditional diplomacy: that is isolationism, even what scholar Kim Key-hiuk has called exclusionism.

For three centuries after the Japanese invasions of the 1590s, Korea will isolate itself from Japan, deal harshly with errant Westerners washing up on its shores, and keep the Chinese at arm's length.

Thus Westerners call Korea the "hermit kingdom," the term expressing the pronounced streak of obstinate hostility toward foreign power and the deep desire for independence that mars traditional Korea.

Ethnocentric and obnoxious to foreigners, a self-contained, autonomous Korea not besmirched by things foreign will remain an ideal for many Koreans.

North Korea will exercise a "hermit kingdom" option by remaining one of the more isolated states in the world; it will really be South Korea that, since 1960, will be revoluionary in the Korean context by pursuing an open-door policy toward world markets and seeking a multilateral, varied diplomacy.

Members of the samurai class adhere to bushi traditions with a renewed interest in Japanese history and cultivating the ways of Confucian scholar-administrators, resulting in the development of the concept of bushido (the way of the warrior).

Another special way of life—chonindo—also emerges.

Chonindo (the way of the townspeople) is a distinct culture that arises in cities such as Osaka, Kyoto, and Edo.

It encourages aspiration to bushido qualities—diligence, honesty, honor, loyalty, and frugality—while blending Shinto, neo-Confucian, and Buddhist beliefs.

Study of mathematics, astronomy, cartography, engineering, and medicine are also encouraged.

Emphasis is placed on quality of workmanship, especially in the arts.

For the first time, urban populations have the means and leisure time to support a new mass culture.

Their search for enjoyment become known as ukiyo (the floating world), an ideal world of fashion and popular entertainment.

Professional female entertainers (geisha), music, popular stories, Kabuki and bunraku (puppet) theater, poetry, a rich literature, and art, exemplified by beautiful woodblock prints (known as ukiyo-e), are all part of this flowering culture.

Literature also flourishes with the talented examples of the playwright Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653-1724) and the poet, essayist, and travel writer Matsuo Basho (1644-94).

The Manchus are not Han Chinese and are strongly resisted, especially in the south, but they had assimilated a great deal of Chinese culture before conquering China Proper.

Realizing that to dominate the empire they will have to do things the Chinese way, the Manchus retain many institutions of Ming and earlier Chinese derivation.

They continue the Confucian court practices and temple rituals, over which the emperors have traditionally presided.

Advanced studies and growing applications of neo-Confucianism contribute to the transition of the social and political order from feudal norms to class- and large- group-oriented practices.

The rule of the people or Confucian man is gradually replaced by the rule of laws.

New laws are developed and new administrative devices are instituted.

A new theory of government and a new vision of society emerges as a means of justifying more comprehensive governance by the bakufu.

Each person has a distinct place in society and is expected to work to fulfill his mission in life.

The people are to be ruled with benevolence by those whose assigned duty it is to rule.

Government is all-powerful but responsible and humane.

Although the class system is influenced by neo-Confucianism, it is not identical to it.

Whereas soldiers and clergy are at the bottom of the hierarchy in the Chinese model, in Japan some members of these classes constitute the ruling elite.

Joseon has barely recovered when the Manchus invade from the north, fighting on all fronts to oust the Ming Dynasty.

Invasions in 1627 and 1636 establish tributary relations between Korea and the Manchus' Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), but they are less deleterious than the Japanese invasions, except in the northwest, where Manchu forces wreak havoc.

Hereafter, the Joseon Dynasty has a period of revival, which, had it continued, might have left Korea much better prepared for its encounter with the West.

Buddhism and Shinto are both still important in Tokugawa Japan.

Buddhism, combined with neo-Confucianism, provides standards of social behavior.

Although not as powerful politically as it had been in the past, Buddhism is espoused by the upper classes.

Proscriptions against Christianity had benefited Buddhism in 1640 when the bakufu had ordered everyone to register at a temple.

The rigid separation of Tokugawa society into han, villages, wards, and households helps reaffirm local Shinto attachments.

Shinto provides spiritual support to the political order and is an important tie between the individual and his community.

Shinto also helps preserve a sense of national identity.

Joseon-period Confucian doctrines do not stop at the nation's boundary but also inform a foreign policy known as "serving the great" (sadae), meaning China.

Joseon lives within China's world order, radiating outward from Zhongguo (the Middle Kingdom) to associated states, of which Korea is the most important.

It is China's little brother, a model tributary state, and in many ways the most important of China's allies.

Koreans revere things Chinese, and China responds by being for the most part a good neighbor, giving more than it takes away.

Exercising a light-handed suzerainty, China assumes that enlightened Koreans will follow it without being forced.

Absolutely convinced of its own superiority, China indulges in a policy that might be called benign neglect of things Korean, thereby allowing Korea substantive autonomy as a nation.

This sophisticated world order will be broken up and laid low by the Western impact in the late nineteenth century, but there are important legacies for the twentieth century.

As dwellers within a small power, Koreans have to learn to be shrewd in foreign policy, and they have a good example of that in China.

Koreans cultivate the sophisticated art of "low determines high" diplomacy, seeking to use foreign power for their own ends, wagging the dog with its tail.

Thus both South Korea and North Korea will often strike foreign observers as rather dependent on big-power support, yet both not only will claim but also strongly assert their absolute autonomy and independence as nation-states, and both will be adept at manipulating their big-power clients.

Until the mid-1980s, North Korea will be masterful, both in getting big powers to fight its battles and in maneuvering between the two communist giants, the Soviet Union and China, to get something from each and to prevent either from dominating it.

Much as in the traditional period, Pyongyang's heart will be with China.

The Cossack Hetmanate is considered as a direct ancestor of today's Ukraine.

In the mid-seventeeth century, a Cossack military quasi-state, the Zaporozhian Host, is formed by Dnieper Cossacks and by Ruthenian peasants who have fled Polish serfdom.

Poland exercises little real control over this population, but finds the Cossacks to be a useful opposing force to the Turks and Tatars, and at times the two are allies in military campaigns.

However the continued harsh enserfment of peasantry by Polish nobility and especially the suppression of the Orthodox Church alienates the Cossacks.

The Cossacks seek representation in the Polish Sejm, recognition of Orthodox traditions, and the gradual expansion of the Cossack Registry.

These are rejected by the Polish nobility, who dominate the Sejm.

In 1648, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Petro Doroshenko lead the largest of the Cossack uprisings against the Commonwealth and the Polish king John II Casimir.

After Khmelnytsky makes an entry into Kiev in 1648, where he is hailed liberator of the people from Polish captivity, he founds the Cossack Hetmanate, which will exist until 1764 (some sources claim until 1782).

Khmelnytsky, deserted by his Tatar allies, suffers a crushing defeat at Berestechko in 1651, and turnsto the Russian tsar for help.

In 1654, Khmelnytsky signs the Treaty of Pereyaslav, forming a military and political alliance with Russia that acknowledges loyalty to the Russian tsar.

The comprehensive legal code introduced in 1649 illustrates the extent of state control over Russian society.

By this time, the boyars had largely merged with the elite bureaucracy, who are obligatory servitors of the state, to form a new nobility, the dvoryanstvo.

The state requires service from both the old and the new nobility, primarily in the military.

In return, they receive land and peasants.

In the preceding century, the state had gradually curtailed peasants' rights to move from one landlord to another; the 1649 code officially attaches peasants to their domicile.

The state fully sanctions serfdom, and runaway peasants become state fugitives.

Landlords have complete power over their peasants and buy, sell, trade, and mortgage them.

Peasants living on state-owned land, however, are not considered serfs.

They are organized into communes, which are responsible for taxes and other obligations.

Like serfs, however, state peasants are attached to the land they farm.

Middle-class urban tradesmen and craftsmen are assessed taxes, and, like the serfs, they are forbidden to change residence.

All segments of the population are subject to military levy and to special taxes.

By chaining much of Muscovite society to specific domiciles, the legal code of 1649 curtails movement and subordinates the people to the interests of the state.