The Fall of Almeida and the Illusion…

The Fall of Almeida and the Illusion of Bourbon Success (August–October 1762)

At the outset of the Second Invasion of Portugal (July–November 1762), the Anglo-Portuguese forces were in dire straits. A British observer, initially dismayed by the poor state of the Portuguese army, described its soldiers as the most "wretched troops" he had ever seen, noting that they were often left without bread for five days while their horses lacked forage.

Amid these hardships, Count Wilhelm von Schaumburg-Lippe, the Allied commander, faced overwhelming odds. At first, the Franco-Spanish forces encountered little resistance, seizing several fortresses with ruined walls and few defenders:

• Alfaiates
• Castelo Rodrigo
• Penamacor
• Monsanto
• Salvaterra do Extremo
• Segura (September 17, 1762)
• Castelo Branco (September 18, 1762)
• Vila Velha (October 2, 1762)

These fortresses surrendered almost without firing a shot, much to Lippe’s frustration. In the aftermath of the war, several Portuguese governors of these strongholds would be tried and convicted for treason and cowardice.

The Siege of Almeida – A Hollow Victory for Spain

The key stronghold of Almeida, the main fortress of Beira, was in no condition to withstand a siege. The British officer O’Hara, who had led Portuguese militias at the Battle of the Douro, advised the fortress commander to evacuate the garrison and fight in open terrain, where defense could be more sustainable. However, the commander refused, stating he could not act without superior orders.

Almeida’s Defenders and Their Plight

• The garrison consisted of two regular regiments and three militia regiments, totaling 3,000–3,500 men.
• Desertion skyrocketed as the Franco-Spanish army approached, leaving only 1,500 defenders.
• The besieging force was an overwhelming 32,000 troops (24,000 Spanish and 8,000 French).

The fortress was commanded by General Palhares, an octogenarian commander widely considered incompetent. His replacement, sent by the Portuguese government, had not arrived in time.

On August 25, 1762, after only nine days of symbolic resistance, Almeida capitulated with honors of war.

The Surrender – A Stunning Capitulation

According to General Dumouriez, the garrison had fired only five or six artillery shots before surrendering. Palhares had even forbidden firing on the enemy, and the entire battle resulted in only two Portuguese casualties.

The terms of surrender were remarkably lenient, largely because the Franco-Spanish army had been shocked at how quickly Almeida proposed to surrender:

• The garrison was allowed to leave with full honors, carrying their guns and luggage.
• They were released under the condition of not fighting Spain for six months.
• The Portuguese defenders marched to reinforce the garrison at Viseu.

Despite this remarkably easy victory, Palhares would later die in a Portuguese prison, condemned for his shameful capitulation.

Madrid Celebrates – But the War Takes a Different Turn

The capture of Almeida, along with its 83 cannons and nine mortars, was hailed as a great victory in Madrid, marking the high point of Spanish success in the war.

At this moment, Spain and France believed the war was turning in their favor. The Bourbon advance led many to assume that the fall of Lisbon was imminent. However, this illusion of victory would soon crumble, as Spain and France learned the hard lesson that occupying fortresses in a guerrilla war meant nothing.

The Fatal Error – Overextending the Franco-Spanish Army

Rather than securing a decisive advantage, the occupation of multiple strongholds became a strategic liability for the Franco-Spanish invaders:

1. Spread Too Thin – With garrisons stationed in multiple fortresses, Bourbon forces were scattered, making it difficult to concentrate their army for a decisive strike.
2. A War of Movement, Not Fortresses – Like Napoleon decades later, the Bourbon high command failed to grasp that Portugal’s war strategy was based on mobility, not static defenses.
3. The Rising Guerrilla Revolt – The occupation of these fortresses fueled national resistance, as Portuguese peasants and militias intensified their attacks on enemy supply lines.

The Guerrilla Uprising – A Growing Nightmare for the Invaders

As the Franco-Spanish army advanced deeper into Beira, they were confronted not just by the Anglo-Portuguese army, but by an increasingly emboldened guerrilla movement:

• The Portuguese militias and irregular fighters relentlessly attacked Bourbon supply convoys and small detachments.
• Communications between French and Spanish divisions were cut off, isolating their forces.
• The civilian population openly resisted, forcing the Bourbon army to expend time and resources on repression.

Even in occupied cities, resistance never ceased, as reported by Count of Aranda, who begged Lippe to intervene to stop the Portuguese popular uprising.

The Final Lesson – Fortresses Mean Nothing in a Guerrilla War

Like Napoleon during the Peninsular War (1808–1814), the Franco-Spanish commanders of 1762 would learn at their own expense that seizing fortresses, while celebrated in Spanish historiography, was ultimately irrelevant in the face of:

• Unrelenting guerrilla warfare
• Supply line disruptions
• An enemy army that refused to fight a conventional battle

Thus, while Madrid rejoiced at the fall of Almeida, the real war was being lost elsewhere, as Portugal’s scorched earth tactics, irregular resistance, and strategic maneuvering by Count Lippe would turn the tide against the invaders.

Conclusion – A Hollow Spanish Victory

While Almeida's fall seemed to signal Bourbon dominance, it did not bring them closer to their ultimate goal—Lisbon. Instead, it overstretched their forces, leaving them vulnerable to the final phase of the Portuguese counteroffensive.

This so-called victory would soon be reversed, as the Anglo-Portuguese forces, supported by the relentless Portuguese militias, would go on to reclaim lost territory and force the invaders to withdraw in total defeat.