Tirumala usurps the throne of the rump…

Don John assaults the rebel stronghold of Galera in late January.

Fighting is house-to-house, long and hard and casualties heavy.

When Galera falls, Don Juan has it leveled and salt plowed into its soil.

The surviving inhabitants are sold into slavery.

A musket ball had grazed Don John's helmet in a skirmish as the campaign against the Moriscos continued, while Quijada had been fatally wounded at his side.

Philip had sympathized with Don John's distress at the loss of Quijada, who had been like a father to him, but admonished him that generals should not be in the thick of combat, but take a safe position from which to direct the battle.

His troops, however, have come to see Don John as more akin to his father Charles V than his famously desk-bound brother Philip.

Increasingly, they address Don Juan as Your Highness.

The example of Galera and Don John's determined advance has intimidated other Morisco villages, which had soon begun to surrender to Don John’s superior forces.

The revolt gradually sputters out through 1570 as its leaders quarrel, seek individual advantage, and murder each other, while the Turks and their Barbary allies turn to the invasion of the Venetian colony of Cyprus.

The Moriscos, after two years of ferocious campaigning, with dreadful atrocities committed by both sides, are removed en masse from Granada.

Only the few Moriscos who had collaborated with the royal forces are permitted to remain in the city and territory of Granada.

To eliminate the possibility of further revolts in Granada, Philip disperses its Morisco population in small groups among the Old Christian towns and villages of the Castilian hinterland, particularly to Valencia and Murcia, and hopes for their assimilation into Spanish society as well as true observance of Christianity.

They are replaced by colonists from Extremadura and Galicia.

In the absence of systematic education and in the face of the hostility of the Christian population, this attempt is also doomed to failure: the Moriscos will continue their particular Muslim ways.

Philip III will eventually order the expulsion of all Moriscos from Spain in 1609.

The Ottoman fleet, commanded by Ali Pasa, Muhammad Saulak (governor of Alexandria), and Uluj Ali (dey of Algiers), enters the Adriatic, and lies in the Gulf of Patras, near Lepanto (Návpaktos), Greece.

The combined Spanish, Venetian, and papal fleets—in alliance the numerical equals of the Turks—of more than two hundred ships sails for Corfu on September 15 and ...

...advances on October 7 in four squadrons against the Ottoman fleet.

Some galleys carry over two hundred oarsmen in what will prove to be the final naval engagement in which galleys are the principal vessels used.

Spanish admiral Don Álvaro de Bazán, marquis de Santa Cruz and the son of a naval officer, had in 1564 aided in the capture of Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera in Morocco and commanded the division of galleys employed to blockade Tetuan, and to suppress the piracy carried on from that port.

Bazán had earned the confidence of Philip II, who had appointed him to command the galleys of Naples in 1568 and in 1569 created him the Marqués de Santa Cruz in 1569.

During the Lepanto operations, Santa Cruz, always favoring the more energetic course, commands the reserve division, and his prompt energy averts a disaster when Uluj Ali, who commands the Turks’ left wing, outmaneuvers the commander of the Christian right, Giovanni Andrea Doria, and breaks the allied line.

Alessandro Farnese, raised at the Spanish court as the son of Ottavio Farnese, second duke of Parma, and Margaret of Austria, fights at Lepanto, as does twenty-four-year-old Spanish writer Miguel de Cervantes, who, born to a poor family in the university town of Alcalá de Henares and lacking the means for much formal education, has become a soldier: he loses the use of his left hand in the battle.

After about four hours of bloody fighting, the allies are victorious, capturing 117 galleys and thousands of men, and handing the Ottoman empire its first major defeat.

Although of little practical value, the battle has a great impact on Western European morale (and will become the subject of paintings by Titian, Tintoretto, and Veronese).

It confirms the Spaniards in their chosen role as champions of Christendom and explains much of their continued willingness to support their king's religious and imperial policies, even in the face of ruinous costs and mounting disasters.

Antonio, continuing to hold the island possessions of Portugal, is supported by a number of French adventurers under Philip Strozzi, a Florentine exile in the service of France.

Alvaro de Bazán, marquis de Santa Cruz, had commanded the fleet that aided the Duke de Alba's conquest of Portugal in 1580, and three years later, at the Second Battle of Terceira, Santa Cruz defeats a superior French naval squadron sent unofficially to support a rebellion in the Azores against Philip II.

His victory is marred, however, by his execution of all French prisoners despite the protests of his own men.

This act does not prevent Philip II from appointing him “captain general of the ocean.” It is after this battle that Santa Cruz urges Philip II to undertake the invasion of England; his letter of August 9, 1583, written to the king from Angra do Heroísmo in Terceira, is generally considered as the first step in the creation of the Spanish Armada.

Álvaro de Bazán, 1st Marquis of Santa Cruz: The Architect of the Spanish Armada (1583–1588)

Álvaro de Bazán (1526–1588), 1st Marquis of Santa Cruz, was one of Spain’s most accomplished naval commanders, known for his strategic foresight and advocacy for war against England. He was the first to propose the Spanish Armada (1588) as a means to invade England, overthrow Elizabeth I, and suppress Protestant support for the Dutch Revolt. However, his bold plans were undermined by Philip II’s indecisiveness, and his sudden death in February 1588 deprived Spain of its most competent admiral just before the Armada campaign.

The Origins of the Spanish Armada Plan (1583–1584)

• As early as 1583, Santa Cruz recognized that England was a major threat to Spain’s empire, particularly due to:
  • English support for the Dutch Revolt against Spanish rule in the Low Countries.
  • English privateers (such as Francis Drake) attacking Spanish treasure fleets and New World colonies.
• On August 9, 1583, from Angra do Heroísmo (Terceira, Azores), Santa Cruz sent Philip II the first formal proposal for an invasion fleet—what would later become the Spanish Armada.

Philip II’s Motivations for War Against England

• Philip had been King of England (1554–1558) through his marriage to Mary I, but upon her death, he lost his claim.
• Elizabeth I, Mary’s Protestant half-sister, was viewed by Philip as a heretic and an illegitimate ruler.
• Philip had supported Catholic plots to replace Elizabeth with Mary, Queen of Scots, but when Elizabeth had Mary executed in 1587, it gave Philip a final pretext for war.
• Pope Sixtus V backed the invasion, treating it as a Catholic crusade against Protestant England and promising financial support if the Armada landed successfully.

Drake’s Raid on Cádiz (1587) and Santa Cruz’s Frustrations

• Santa Cruz had been stationed in Lisbon, preparing the Armada, but was hindered by Philip’s delays and lack of funds.
• In 1587, Francis Drake launched a daring raid on Cádiz, burning Spanish ships and delaying the Armada’s preparations by a year.
• Despite Santa Cruz’s requests for more resources, Philip blamed him for the slow progress, refusing to acknowledge the strategic damage caused by Drake’s attack.
• Santa Cruz’s independent thinking and criticism of Philip’s indecisiveness led to his falling out of favor with the king.

Santa Cruz’s Death and the Impact on the Armada

• On February 9, 1588, Álvaro de Bazán died suddenly in Lisbon at the age of 61, reportedly weakened by the king’s unjust reproaches.
• His death left the Armada without its most experienced admiral, and command was passed to the Duke of Medina Sidonia, an inexperienced nobleman with little naval expertise.
• Many historians believe that Santa Cruz’s leadership could have improved the Armada’s strategy, possibly altering the outcome of the campaign.

Conclusion: A Visionary Admiral Undone by Royal Hesitation

Álvaro de Bazán’s early recognition of England’s threat and his vision for the Spanish Armada showed his strategic brilliance, but his plans were undermined by Philip II’s delays, financial struggles, and mismanagement. His death in 1588 deprived Spain of its best naval commander, leaving the Armada in the hands of an unprepared successor, ultimately contributing to its defeat against England later that year. Santa Cruz remains one of Spain’s greatest admirals, a leader who saw the future of naval warfare but was unable to see his plans to fruition.

The Appointment of Medina Sidonia and the Final Preparations for the Spanish Armada (1588)

Philip II of Spain, having long planned an invasion of England, insisted on appointing Don Alonso Pérez de Guzmán, 7th Duke of Medina Sidonia, as commander of the Spanish Armada—a decision made three days before the death of the more experienced Álvaro de Bazán, Marquis of Santa Cruz.

Philip’s motivation for this appointment remains uncertain, but it may have been influenced by Medina Sidonia’s:

• High noble rank, ensuring obedience from other Spanish grandees.
• Administrative competence, gained from his successful governance of Andalusia.
• Personal modesty and tact, making him unlikely to challenge Philip’s direct orders.
• Reputation as a devout Christian, aligning with Philip’s view of the Armada as a holy crusade.

However, Medina Sidonia himself recognized his own limitations and attempted to decline the command, citing:

• Lack of military and naval experience.
• Poor health and susceptibility to seasickness.
• Little knowledge of English defenses or Spanish war strategy.
• Inability to finance any part of the expedition.

Philip’s secretaries, Juan de Idiaquez and Cristóbal de Moura, did not show this letter to the king, fearing his reaction.

Medina Sidonia’s Role in Preparing the Armada

Despite his reluctance, historians generally view Medina Sidonia’s organizational efforts favorably. Under his leadership:

• The chaotic distribution of supplies and weaponry was reorganized.
• Ammunition supplies were increased from 30 to 50 rounds per gun.
• The inclusion of Castilian galleons from the "Indian Guard" nearly doubled the Armada’s fighting strength.
• He maintained good relationships with his subordinate commanders, a critical factor in the fleet’s cohesion.

However, delays led to a shortage of skilled sailors, and food supplies deteriorated in quality and quantity, weakening the fleet’s overall readiness.

Religious Justification and Papal Support

• Pope Sixtus V supported the invasion, treating it as a holy crusade against Protestant England.
• Philip was allowed to collect crusade taxes, further financing the Armada.
• On April 25, 1588, the Armada’s banner was blessed in a grand religious ceremony, modeled on the blessing of the Christian fleet before the Battle of Lepanto (1571).

Conclusion: A Questionable Appointment with Mixed Results

Medina Sidonia’s appointment was controversial, as he was neither an experienced sailor nor a seasoned general, but his organizational improvements strengthened the Armada’s material preparedness. However, Philip II’s rigid strategic planning, the Armada’s logistical difficulties, and unfavorable weather conditions would ultimately lead to disaster. Whether Medina Sidonia himself truly believed in the Armada’s chances of success remains debated, but skepticism was widespread among Spanish commanders and foreign observers even before the fleet set sail.