Commodity

Rare earth elements (REEs)

1950 CE – 2215 CE

The name is wrong twice over, and the second error is the whole structure of the market. They are not rare: cerium at 68 parts per million is more abundant in the crust than copper. And they are not earths. What is scarce is not the elements but the separation — because the lanthanides are chemically almost indistinguishable, pulling them apart requires hundreds of successive solvent-extraction stages, and that is where the entire difficulty lies. The commodity is a process rather than a mineral.

That relocates the chokepoint, which is the fact everything else follows from. Almost every other commodity on this list has its bottleneck at or near the ground: the field, the seam, the strait, the smelter. Rare earths have theirs strictly downstream of extraction. A country can hold a world-class deposit and have nothing, because ore without a separation plant is gravel. It is why China's position rests on processing rather than on reserves, why opening new mines has not answered it, and why American ore spent years traveling to China and back.

There is then a second bottleneck behind the first. Separation yields an oxide; the oxide must be reduced to metal, alloyed, and sintered into a magnet, and that capacity is concentrated too. So a state can own the mine and the separation plant and still not have magnets — which are the thing defense systems and electric motors actually require. Two sequential chokepoints, and neither of them is the mine.

The market has already defeated one round of diversification, which is why current policy looks as it does. The informal embargo on Japan in 2010 produced a price spike; the spike drew investment; output then rose, the price collapsed, and the new entrants did not survive it. Nobody had to do anything deliberate to achieve that. No private investor can underwrite a mine and a separation plant against a competitor who sets the price, and that memory is behind every instrument now in use.

Hence an instrument with no real precedent on this list. On 10 July 2025 the United States Department of Defense took $400 million of newly created convertible preferred stock in MP Materials together with a warrant, both at an initial conversion price of $30.03, amounting on an as-converted basis to roughly 15 percent of the common stock and making the Department the company's largest shareholder. Alongside the equity came a ten-year floor of $110 a kilogram for NdPr output whether sold or stockpiled; a ten-year undertaking that all magnets from a new plant would be bought; a $1 billion bank commitment to build it, with commissioning expected from 2028 and total American magnet capacity reaching an estimated 10,000 tonnes; and a $150 million loan for heavy rare-earth separation at Mountain Pass. The price floor is the significant term. It transfers to the state the one risk that cannot be hedged privately — that the incumbent will simply lower the price until the challenger fails — and it is the clearest case on this list of a government removing price risk in order to call a supply chain into existence.

The standoff itself is suspended rather than settled, and it has a date. China's licensing regime of April 2025, covering seven medium and heavy rare earths, has run without interruption since it was issued. The October 2025 package added five further elements, brought rare-earth technology itself under control, and reached outside China altogether by requiring Beijing's approval before a foreign-made magnet could be exported if it contained as little as a tenth of one percent Chinese-origin rare-earth content. Washington's Affiliates Rule extended Entity List restrictions to any firm anywhere half-owned by a listed party. After the two governments met at Busan on 30 October 2025, both instruments were paused with expiry dates written into them: the October package until 10 November 2026, and the Affiliates Rule through 9 November 2026, its requirements returning the following day "and extending indefinitely." What was conceded was the expansion. What was kept was the apparatus. A separate American defense-procurement prohibition on Chinese-origin rare-earth metals and magnets is scheduled to take effect in January 2027.

On boundaries: the seventeen elements, their ores and concentrates, the separated oxides, and the metals and alloys are here. A sintered magnet is here where the entry turns on the rare-earth supply and electrical equipment where it turns on the device. Thorium and uranium occurring alongside them are uranium. Catalysts, polishing compounds and phosphors sold as chemical products are industrial chemicals. Scandium and yttrium are here with the lanthanides, on the convention that groups them by where they occur rather than by their electronic structure. The date is c. 1950, on Mountain Pass, with permanent magnets from the 1980s.