The Near and Middle East (1684 – 1827 CE)

Empires in Decline, Pilgrimage Routes in Turmoil, and the Return of Reforming Powers

Geography & Environmental Context

The Near and Middle East spanned the eastern Mediterranean, the Arabian Peninsula, Mesopotamia, Persia, and the Caucasus—a crossroads from the Nile to the Hindu Kush. Its three interlocking subregions—the Near East(Egypt, Hejaz, Yemen, Levant, Sudan, southwestern Turkey, and Cyprus), the Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, eastern Arabia, and most of Anatolia), and Southeast Arabia (southern Oman, eastern Yemen, and Socotra)—together formed a vast zone of deserts, deltas, plateaus, and pilgrimage corridors. Major anchors included the Nile, Tigris–Euphrates, and Zagros–Caucasus uplands; the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Arabian Seacoasts; and the high valleys of Yemen and Oman that bridged Africa and Asia.

Climate & Environmental Shifts

The late Little Ice Age imposed alternating drought and flood.

• Mesopotamia and Iran endured erratic rains and destructive river floods.

• Egypt oscillated between low- and high-Nile years; plague and famine shadowed poor floods.

• Hejaz and Yemen suffered water scarcity punctuated by torrential storms.

• Caucasus winters grew harsher; earthquakes at Tabriz (1721), Shiraz (1824), and along the Levantine Riftreshaped towns.

• Dhofar and Hadhramawt relied on fickle khareef monsoons, while Socotra was struck by periodic cyclones.

Despite volatility, canal maintenance, terrace farming, and nomadic mobility preserved regional resilience.

Subsistence & Settlement

• Mesopotamia & Iran: Irrigated grains, dates, and silk; qanats and canals remained vital to subsistence and taxation.

• Caucasus & Anatolia: Pastoralism and mountain farming—wine, fruit, and grain—supported caravan towns like Tiflis, Yerevan, and Aleppo.

• Levant & Egypt: Terrace agriculture (olives, vines, citrus) complemented Nile wheat, barley, and sugar.

• Arabian littoral: Date groves, pearling, and fishing from Basra to Muscat linked desert to sea.

• Yemen & Oman: Terraced grains, coffee, and frankincense; mixed herding in uplands.

• Sudan: Millet and sorghum in river belts tied to Egypt’s provisioning system after Muḥammad ʿAlī’s conquest (1820–1821).

Urban centers—Cairo, Baghdad, Isfahan, Damascus, Tehran, Muscat, Sanaʿa, and Tiflis—functioned as nodes of governance, trade, and craft.

Technology & Material Culture

• Agrarian infrastructure: Qanats, canals, and dikes remained the hydraulic spine; terrace systems in Yemen and Palestine embodied millennia of continuity.

• Crafts & manufactures: Persian silks and carpets; Aleppine cottons; Damascene soap; Cairene brassware; Georgian and Armenian metallurgy.

• Architecture: Ottoman domes, Safavid and Qajar mosques, Armenian churches, and Yemeni tower-houses defined skylines.

• Maritime innovation: Omani dhows and Red Sea sambuks maintained oceanic trade; firearms and artillery modernized gradually through Ottoman and Persian reforms.

• Printing & learning: The French expedition to Egypt (1798–1801) introduced presses and surveying; by the 1820s Muḥammad ʿAlī’s workshops were producing cotton gins, arms, and canal plans.

Movement & Interaction Corridors

• Caravan arteries: Aleppo–Mosul–Baghdad; Isfahan–Tabriz–Yerevan–Baku; Basra–Shiraz–Hormuz–Muscat.

• Pilgrimage routes: Cairo and Damascus caravans converged on Mecca until disrupted by Wahhabi–Saʿūdī control (1803–1812); Egyptian forces restored Ottoman sovereignty (1811–1818).

• Maritime spheres: Omani fleets projected power across the Indian Ocean to Zanzibar; Hadhrami merchants spread to Gujarat, Southeast Asia, and the Swahili coast.

• Caspian & Black Sea fronts: Russian expansion brought forts and commerce, drawing Persia into treaties (Gulistan 1813, Turkmenchay 1828).

• Nile & Sudan corridors: River convoys moved grain and troops; Khartoum and Sennar became extensions of Cairo’s fiscal reach.

Cultural & Symbolic Expressions

• Ottoman provinces: Sunni institutions, Sufi lodges, and urban guilds organized civic life; Coptic, Armenian, Greek, and Jewish communities sustained schools and trade.

• Persia: Shiʿism remained the ideological core from Safavid through Qajar eras; Isfahan and Tehran mosques, gardens, and miniatures embodied Persian identity.

• Caucasus: Islamic and Christian traditions coexisted; oral epics preserved frontier memory.

• Arabian coasts: Poetry, pearling songs, and mosque schools reflected maritime Islam.

• Hejaz & Yemen: Pilgrimage festivals, Sufi orders, and coffee rituals intertwined devotion and commerce.

• Egypt: Al-Azhar scholars debated governance; after 1798, the Arabic press and translation offices of Muḥammad ʿAlī inaugurated modern intellectual life.

Environmental Adaptation & Resilience

• Nomadic transhumance adjusted to drought belts from Arabia to Iran.

• Oasis and terrace restoration maintained food security.

• Maritime adaptation: Oman’s sea routes and Gulf pearling offset inland disruption.

• Pilgrim provisioning: Waqf-funded cisterns, markets, and bakeries sustained caravans.

• Irrigation renewal: In Egypt, canal repair and proto-barrage planning sought to stabilize Nile floods and expand cotton cultivation.

Political & Military Shocks

• Safavid collapse (1722): Afghan incursions toppled Isfahan; Ottoman and Russian invasions followed.

• Nader Shah (1736–1747): Restored Persian power, campaigned in India and the Caucasus.

• Qajar consolidation (1794–1827): Centralized Iran but ceded territory to Russia.

• Ottoman strain: Frontier wars with Russia; Wahhabi revolt in Arabia; provincial autonomy in Syria and Egypt.

• Muḥammad ʿAlī’s rise (1805): Eliminated Mamluks (1811), reformed army and monopolies, annexed Sudan (1820–1821).

• Omani revival: The Al Bu Saʿid dynasty (from 1749) rebuilt fleets, expelled Portuguese remnants, and dominated Gulf trade.

• European encroachment: Consuls, treaties, and naval patrols—French in the Levant, British in the Gulf and Red Sea—tightened economic dependence though not yet direct rule.

Transition

Between 1684 and 1827 CE, the Near and Middle East transformed from a network of venerable Islamic empires into a patchwork of reforming provinces and maritime powers under growing Eurasian pressure. The Safavids vanished, the Qajars struggled with Russia, and the Ottomans faced internal revolt and European diplomacy. Oman extended Arab reach to East Africa, while Muḥammad ʿAlī’s Egypt pioneered modern bureaucratic reform.
By 1827, caravan and monsoon still ordered daily life, yet behind their continuity loomed the industrial powers of Europe—ready to recast these crossroads into the geopolitical heart of the nineteenth-century world.

The Middle East (1684–1827 CE): Ottoman Decline, Safavid Collapse, and the Rise of New Powers

Geography & Environmental Context

The Middle East includes Iraq, Iran, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, most of Turkey (except the European part and southwest Anatolia), eastern Jordan, all but southernmost Lebanon, eastern Saudi Arabia, and northern Oman. Anchors include the Tigris–Euphrates basin (Mesopotamia), the Zagros and Caucasus ranges, the Iranian Plateau, the Caspian littoral, the Syrian Desert, and the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea coasts. This geography spans irrigated river valleys, steppe corridors, semi-arid plateaus, and mountain enclaves linking Anatolia, Persia, and Arabia.

Climate & Environmental Shifts

The period fell within the late Little Ice Age, producing cooler winters in Anatolia, Armenia, and the Caucasus, alongside recurrent droughts in Mesopotamia and Iran. Floods along the Tigris and Euphrates periodically devastated farmlands, while earthquakes struck Tabriz (1721) and Shiraz (1824). Pastoral nomads in Arabia, Iran, and the Caucasus moved widely to buffer drought, while irrigation in Mesopotamia and northern Iran faltered under war and neglect but revived when political stability returned.

Subsistence & Settlement

• Mesopotamia: Date groves, rice paddies, and cereal fields along the Tigris–Euphrates remained staples; tribal confederations dominated countryside around Ottoman Baghdad.

• Iranian Plateau: Dryland farming (wheat, barley) and oasis gardening (fruit, melons) sustained populations; silk in Gilan and rice in Mazandaran anchored Caspian subsistence.

• Caucasus (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan): Pastoralism, viticulture, and orchards flourished in upland valleys; caravan towns like Tiflis and Yerevan mediated exchange.

• Anatolia & Syria: Grain, olives, and vines in uplands; Aleppo and Damascus remained provisioning and craft centers despite periodic crises.

• Persian Gulf & Oman: Fishing, date cultivation, and pearling dominated, with maritime trade sustaining settlements from Basra to Muscat.

Technology & Material Culture

Agriculture relied on qanats, canals, and animal-powered irrigation. Fortresses and caravanserais dotted plateau routes; mosques, madrasas, and Armenian and Georgian churches anchored towns. Persian silk textiles, Azerbaijani carpets, and Aleppine cottons were prized. Gunpowder weapons, artillery, and fortress improvements spread, though unevenly. Maritime craft ranged from Ottoman galleys to Omani dhows controlling Indian Ocean lanes.

Movement & Interaction Corridors

• Caravan routes: Linked Aleppo to Mosul and Baghdad; Isfahan to Tabriz, Yerevan, and Baku; Basra to the Gulf; Shiraz and Yazd to Hormuz/Muscat.

• Persian Gulf: Omani seafaring extended across the Arabian Sea; Basra exported dates and grain; pearl fisheries tied Bahrain and Qatar to Indian and European markets.

• Caspian trade: Connected Gilan’s silk and Astrakhan’s markets; Russian expansion brought new garrisons and merchants.

• Imperial contest zones: Anatolia and the Caucasus saw repeated wars; Iraq oscillated between Ottoman and Persian control.

Cultural & Symbolic Expressions

• Ottoman provinces: Islam anchored society through mosques, Sufi lodges, and guilds; Armenian and Syriac Christians maintained schools and churches; Jewish communities thrived in Aleppo and Baghdad.

• Safavid Iran: Shi‘ism remained state religion; Isfahan’s mosques and gardens expressed grandeur, though after the Safavid collapse, Qajar art and architecture reshaped Persian identity.

• Caucasus: Christian Orthodoxy (Georgian, Armenian) coexisted with Islam; mountain oral epics and shrine pilgrimages preserved memory.

• Arabian littoral: Tribal poetry, pearl-diver songs, and Omani mosque schools expressed maritime identity.

Environmental Adaptation & Resilience

• Nomadic strategies: Tribal migrations across steppe and desert balanced drought and grazing.

• Oasis and qanat systems: Managed water for cereals and orchards; local repair after war was critical.

• Silk, carpet, and date economies: Offered export resilience when crops failed.

• Maritime trade: Oman and Gulf ports buffered against inland disruption by maintaining Indian Ocean routes.

Transition

Between 1684 and 1827, the Middle East was a contested imperial borderland. The Safavid dynasty collapsed (1722); Afghans, Ottomans, and Russians fought over Iran and the Caucasus. Nader Shah briefly restored Persian power (1736–1747), raiding into India and the Caucasus. The Qajar dynasty (from 1794) consolidated Iran but conceded land to Russia in treaties (Gulistan 1813, Turkmenchay 1828). The Ottoman Empire faced Russian expansion in the Black Sea and Caucasus and Wahhabi revolts in Arabia. Oman emerged as a naval power, dominating the Gulf and East Africa. By 1827, the region was still a mosaic of caravans, mosques, and fortified towns, but the balance of power had tilted toward European and Russian pressures—foreshadowing the 19th-century age of colonial rivalry and reform.

Arabia in general and the gulf in particular experience a turbulent time in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

To the southeast, the Al Said of Oman are extending their influence northward, and from Iraq the Ottoman Turks are extending their influence southward.

From the east, both the Iranians and the British are becoming increasingly involved in Arab affairs.

The most significant development in the region, however, is the Wahhabi movement.

The name Wahhabi derives from Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, who dies in 1792.

He had grown up in an oasis town in central Arabia where he studied Hanbali law, usually considered the strictest of Islamic legal schools, with his grandfather.

While still a young man, he had left home and continued his studies in Medina and then in Iraq and Iran.

When he returns from Iran to Arabia in the late 1730s, he attacks as idolatry many of the customs followed by tribes in the area who venerate rocks and trees.

He extend his criticism to practices of the Twelve Imam Shia, such as veneration of the tombs of holy men.

He focuses on the central Muslim principle that there is only one God and that this God does not share his divinity with anyone.

From this principle, his students begin to refer to themselves as muwahhidun (sing., muwahhid), or "unitarians."

Their detractors refer to them as "Wahhabis."

Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab considers himself a reformer and looks for a political figure to give his ideas a wider audience.

He finds this person in Muhammad ibn Saud, the emire of Ad Diriyah, a small town near Riyadh.

The two swear a traditional Muslim pledge in 1744 in which they promise to work together to establish a new state (which will later become present-day Saudi Arabia) based on Islamic principles.

The limited but successful military campaigns of Muhammad ibn Saud cause Arabs from all over the peninsula to feel the impact of Wahhabi ideas.

The Wahhabis become known for a fanaticism similar to that of the early Kharijites.

This fanaticism helps to intensify conflicts in the gulf.

Wahhabi fervor is also significant in the history of the present-day UAE.

The Al Qasimi tribes that have controlled the area since the eighteenth century adapt Wahhabi ideas and transfer the movement's religious enthusiasm to the piracy in which they had traditionally engaged.

Whereas Wahhabi thought opposes all that is not orthodox in Islam, it particularly opposes non-Muslim elements such as the increasing European presence in the Persian Gulf.

The increased European presence results in large part from commercial competition between Al Qasimi merchants and British merchants for the lucrative trade between India and the Persian Gulf in the early nineteenth century.

British merchants enlist the British navy to assist them by launching attacks on Al Qasimi strongholds in the present-day UAE as early as 1809.

The navy does not succeed in controlling the situation until 1819, in which year, the British send a fleet from India that destroys Ras al Khaymah, an Al Qasimi port at the eastern end of the gulf.

From Ras al Khaymah, the British fleet destroys Al Qasimi ships along both sides of the gulf.

The British have no desire to take over the desolate areas along the gulf; they only wish to control the trading cities.

The British decide to leave most tribal leaders in power and conclude a series of treaties with them.

As a result of these truces, the Arab side of the gulf comes to be known as the "Trucial Coast."

This area had previously been under the nominal control of the sultan in Oman, although the Trucial Coast tribes are not part of the Ibadi imamate.

The area has also been referred to as "Trucial Oman" to distinguish it from the part of Oman under the sultan that is not bound by treaty obligation.

The British in 1820 seem primarily interested in controlling the Al Qasimi, whose main centers are Ras al Khaymah, Ajman, and Sharjah, which were all small ports along the southeastern gulf coast.

The original treaties, however, also involve Dubai and Bahrain, which are entrepôts.

The inclusion of these ports bring two other extended families, the Bani Yas and the Al Khalifa, into the trucial system.

Wahhabi thought has a special impact on the history of Qatar.

Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab's ideas prove popular among many of the peninsula tribes, including the Al Thani, before the Al Khalifa attempt to take over the area from Bahrain at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

As a result, Wahhabi beliefs motivate Al Thani efforts to resist the attempt of the Al Khalifa, who reject Wahhabism, to gain control of the peninsula.

Wahhabism will distinguish Qatar religiously from its neighbors in the early twenty-first century.

Tribes from the interior have always raided settled communities along the coast, but the Wahhabi faith provides them with a justification for continuing these incursions to spread true Islam.

Accordingly, in the nineteenth century Wahhabi tribe under the leadership of the Al Saud move at various times against Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman.

The Wahhabi faith creates internal dissension in Oman as well as an external menace because it proves popular with some of the Ibadi tribes in the Omani interior.

The rise of Al Saud is closely linked with Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab (1703-87), a Muslim scholar whose ideas form the basis of the Wahhabi movement.

He grew up in Uyaynah, an oasis in southern Najd, where with his grandfather he studied Hanbali Is- lamic law, one of the strictest Muslim legal schools.

While still a young man, he left Uyaynah to study with other teachers, the usual way to pursue higher education in the Islamic world.

He studied in Medina and then went to Iraq and to Iran.

Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab's ideas must be considered in the context of Islamic practice to understand their significance.

There is a difference between the established rituals clearly defined in religious texts that all Muslims perform and popular Islam.

The latter refers to local practice that is not universal.

The Shia practice of visiting shrines is an example of a popular practice.

The Shia had continued to revere the imams even after their death and so visited their graves to ask favors of the imams buried there.

Over time, Shia scholars had rationalized the practice and it has become established.

Some of the Arabian tribes have come to attribute the same sort of power that the Shia recognize in the tomb of an imam to natural objects such as trees and rocks.

Such beliefs are particularly disturbing to Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab.

He returns in the late 1730s to the Najdi town of Huraymila and begins to write and preach against both Shia and local popular practices.

He focuses on the Muslim principle that there is only one God and that God does not share his power with anyone—not imams, and certainly not trees or rocks.

From this unitarian principle, his students begin to refer to themselves as muwahhidun (unitarians). Their detractors refer to them as "Wahhabis"—or "followers of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab," which has a pejorative connotation.

The idea of a unitary god is not new.

Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, however, attaches political importance to it.

He directs his attack against the Shia.

He also seeks out local leaders, trying to convince them that his teaching is an Islamic issue.

He expands his message to include strict adherence to the principles of Islamic law.

He refers to himself as a "reformer" and looks for a political figure who might give his ideas a wider audience.

Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, lacking political support in Huraymila, returns to Uyaynah where he wins over some local leaders.

Uyaynah, however, is close to Al Hufuf, one of the Twelver Shia centers in eastern Arabia, and its leaders are understandably alarmed at the anti-Shia tone of the Wahhabi message.

Partly as a result of their influence, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab is obliged to leave Uyaynah and headed for Ad Diriyah.

The Ottoman Empire had begun its ordering of the Arab Middle East in the sixteenth century, linking the fertile central Arabian oases of Nejd commercially and intellectually with western Arabia and the Fertile Crescent.

The area's remoteness and relative poverty have caused it to be often isolated, however, from general political and military trends.

As the population of such oasis towns as 'Uyaynah slowly rose from the sixteenth to the early eighteenth centuries, the 'ulama' (the learned of Islam), residing here has increased in number and sophistication.

Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, born in 'Uyaynah in 1703 to a family of religious judges and scholars, had traveled widely in other regions of the Middle East as a young man.

Influenced by the early fourteenth century teaching of the Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyah, he began, upon his return to 'Uyaynah, to preach his revolutionary ideas of religious reformation on fundamentalist lines.

He begins to abuse the Islamic schools of thought—i.e., those of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'ie and Hanbali—and labels those who disagreed with him as Murtadd (apostate), or Mushrik (polytheist).

'Uthman ibn Mu'ammar, 'Uyaynah's ruler, welcomes 'Abd al-Wahhab and subscribes to his doctrines, but many oppose him.

The Middle East: 1744–1755 CE

Consolidation of the Wahhabi-Saudi Alliance

Between 1744 and 1755, the alliance between Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud significantly solidifies, transforming Ad Diriyah into a powerful political and religious center in central Arabia. United by a mutual commitment to the strict reformist Islamic doctrine of Wahhabism, they undertake a campaign to unify surrounding tribes under their authority. Muhammad bin Saud provides the essential political and military leadership, while Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab’s rigorous interpretation of Islam offers a powerful ideological framework. In 1744, they formally cement their alliance through a traditional Muslim oath, pledging mutual support to establish a state governed strictly by Islamic principles. This pivotal partnership sets the foundation for a future Saudi state, emphasizing the Al Saud family's clearly defined religious mission and political authority.

Turmoil and Dynastic Change in Oman

In Oman, political instability deepens following the collapse of Yarubid authority. After the death of Saif bin Sultan II, Ahmad bin Said al-Busaidi, governor of the Suhar garrison, emerges as a strong contender for leadership. Ahmad bin Said successfully drives out the last Persian forces from Oman in 1747, capitalizing on internal conflicts arising from Nader Shah's declining Persian empire. He decisively assumes control, culminating in his election as Imam of Oman, Zanzibar, Pemba, and Kilwa in 1749, marking the establishment of the Al Bu Sa'id dynasty. Ahmad shifts the capital from the traditional Ibadi stronghold of Ar Rustaq to Muscat, significantly distancing his rule from traditional Ibadi political structures.

Decline of Nader Shah and Persian Instability

The period sees the rapid decline and eventual assassination of Nader Shah in 1747, causing severe instability throughout Persia. His death plunges the region into factional conflict, significantly reducing Persian influence in neighboring areas, including the Persian Gulf and Iraq. The resulting power vacuum heightens regional instability, facilitating local tribal resurgence and diminishing centralized governance.

Ottoman Authority and Growing Tribal Autonomy

Ottoman control continues to wane, increasingly challenged by tribal autonomy and internal dissent. Powerful tribal confederations such as the Muntafiq and Bani Lam assert greater independence, severely limiting Ottoman influence. The Baban Dynasty in Iraqi Kurdistan fortifies its position, maintaining autonomy and resisting direct Ottoman governance. These tribal dynamics reinforce fragmented control, severely constraining Ottoman central authority.

Economic and Social Dynamics in the Persian Gulf

Despite ongoing political turbulence, economic conditions on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf remain comparatively stable due to trade, pearl harvesting, and limited agriculture. This economic vitality attracts tribes from the Arabian interior, notably the Al Thani, who settle in Qatar during the early to mid-eighteenth century. Originally Bedouin, the Al Thani transition to fishing, pearling, and cultivation of date palms, playing a crucial role in the economic landscape of the region.

Legacy of the Era

From 1744 to 1755, significant political realignments shape the Middle East profoundly. The Wahhabi-Saudi alliance consolidates power in central Arabia, laying firm foundations for Saudi influence. Oman undergoes a critical dynastic shift with the rise of the Al Bu Sa'id dynasty, enhancing internal cohesion and reducing external interference. Persian instability following Nader Shah’s assassination intensifies regional volatility, while persistent tribal autonomy severely curtails Ottoman control. These intertwined developments profoundly impact subsequent decades, setting the stage for continued political, religious, and social transformations.